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1“Leading Political Scientists Warn of Threat to American Democracy in Rare 
Nonpartisan Statement,”1
Democracy in the United States of America is in decline. In much the same way that 
progressive tort reform was made possible by the democratic gains of the mid twentieth century, 
much of the current tort retrenchment has been made possible by our democratic losses since the 
late twentieth century. Just as tort reform in the 1960s and 1970s helped consolidate and protect 
our democratic gains, the tort “reforms” from the 1980s to the present have helped further 
consolidate and protect our rising plutocracy. 
 After a brief introduction setting the stage for the argument that follows, part II details the 
extent of our economic inequality while parts III and IV show how our economic inequality is 
bound up with political inequality and the demise of our democracy, both in terms of being heard 
by those who represent us (part III), and in terms of having a voice to reach those who represent 
us (part IV). Gross inequality in political voice is bound up with a lack of responsiveness and 
accountability and this in turn leads to the erosion of government interventions to correct or 
counterbalance the ever widening gap between the “haves” and “have-nots.”  As Part V 
illustrates, interventions by the courts and legislators in the area of torts follows this model. This 
is illustrated by counter-democratic interventions by the Supreme Court as well as the bulk of 
tort reform efforts since the 1980s. Part V, will first briefly address the larger terrain of tort 
 
1 Press Release, American Political Science Association, Leading Political Scientists Warn of Threat to American 
Democracy in Rare Nonpartisan Statement (2004), www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforce.  See also E. J. Dionne Jr., 
Poor Version of Democracy, WASHINGTON POST, June 11, 2004, at A25 (calling attention to and commenting on the 
Task Force report), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33144-2004Jun10.html. 
Although not conceived as such, this article, in effect, is a response to the challenge raised by Nockleby and Curreri, 
“that those who wish to defend the civil justice system against retrenchment should explicitly address how the legal 
system changed from 1900 to 1980 to grant far more protections to citizens.” John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 
100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (2005). 
2reform (both progressive and regressive) before turning to the role of the Supreme Court in tort 
reform. The article concludes with a few comments on developments in the area of products 
liability that may cast a ray of hope on the otherwise gloomy condition of tort law and 
democracy in America.  
I INTRODUCTION 
While we wage war in distant lands for the purported purpose of spreading democracy, 
our own democracy is under threat. The threat is not external; it does not come from communists 
or terrorists, but from deep within the fabric of our society.  It does not come solely nor even 
primarily from the president, the conservative right, or our national leaders, although they are 
part of the problem. Rather, the threat comes from an ever widening gap between those who have 
and those who do not have: 
• a stake in this country,  
• a voice and hand in shaping this country’s future,  
• and the ears of others who are shaping that future.  
Thus, the gap between the “haves” and “have nots” is not merely economic but cuts 
across both socio-economic aspects of life (education, jobs, income, mobility) and civil and 
political aspects of life (the ability to participate in civic and political life, through voting, 
volunteering, protesting, donating, etc.). This, in turn, impacts the responsiveness of government 
to the needs and preferences of the people.   
This account of the derailing of our democracy is not based on an elaborate or idealistic 
view of democracy. It is not based on shattering the illusion of direct democratic participation, or 
3on the dream of a truly deliberative democracy, 2 or even a republican democracy.3 The standard 
is not the equal provision of conditions for human development and self actualization, 4 nor even 
the ideal of equal concern and respect, although we are failing on all these accounts.5 No, the 
critique is based on the failure of even achieving the modest ambitions of representative 
democracy. The standard is based on the rather simple notions that democracy consists of “… 
government of the people, by the people, for the people"6 and that a “a key characteristic of a 
democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, 
considered as political equals”7 Democracy requires accountability and respect for the rule of 
law and this entails equality before the law. It also requires transparency and access to accurate 
information, for without it, “the people” have no chance of authentic participation, or of holding 
representatives accountable.  As will be detailed below, our democracy is failing, because we do 
not have government by, of, or for the people; those who govern are not responsive to the people, 
considered as political equals.  
 
2 The argument does not rely on a conception of democracy that is as rich as deliberative democracy, which requires 
not only that representatives represent the populace, but that they should have inclusive deliberations about the 
decisions they make and justify their decision with publicly acceptable reasons.  A GUTMANN & D THOMPSON, WHY 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 3 (2004).   
3 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE 
BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL, (CH. 1) (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (comparing liberal, republican and deliberative 
forms of democracy).  
4 McPherson identifies the underlying moral value of democracy as “provid[ing] the conditions for the free 
development of human capacities, and to do this equally for all members of society.” C.B. MACPHERSON THE REAL 
WORLD OF DEMOCRACY 58 (1966). 
5 Ronald Dworkin’s view of our Constitution is “that it aims to create …a "partnership" rather than a majoritarian 
form of democracy by insisting that all citizens are entitled to an equal role and voice in their self-government, that 
government at all levels must treat citizens with equal concern, and that government must leave individual citizens 
free to make the personal decisions for themselves that they cannot yield to others without compromising their self-
respect.”  Ronald Dworkin, Judge Roberts on Trial, 52 NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Oct. 2005), available at,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18330#fnr6 (referring to his elaboration of this ideal in FREEDOM'S LAW (1996), 
and SOVEREIGN VIRTUE (2000)). 
6 Abraham Lincoln , 16th President of the United States of America (1961-65), The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 
1863). Even the U.S. State Department begins its discussion of the definition of “What is Democracy” with 
Lincoln’s definition, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/whatsdem/whatdm2.htm. 
7 ROBERT DAHL, POLIARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971). Note, this is a standard liberal notion of 
democracy.  
4Although it is not uncommon to hear of references to our founding as a democratic 
founding, this is not an accurate depiction of our history.8 It took the United States nearly 200 
years to achieve a level of political participation which would justify the claim that it was a 
democracy. As C.B. MacPherson pointed out long ago, 
 
In our Western societies the democratic franchise was not installed until after the 
liberal society and the liberal state were firmly established. Democracy came as a 
top dressing. It had to accommodate itself to the soil that had already been 
prepared by the operation of the competitive, individualist, market society, and by 
the operation of the liberal state, which served that society through a system of 
competing though not democratic political parties. It was the liberal state that was 
democratized, and in the process, democracy was liberalized.9
It is difficult to speak at all about American democracy prior to 1920 when women 
finally won the right to vote.10 But further, as Alexander Keyssar notes, until the 1960s most 
African Americans could not vote in the South,11 and “As late as 1950s, basic political rights 
were denied [not only to those blacks in the South but]…to significant pockets of voters 
elsewhere, including the illiterate in New York, Native Americans in Utah, many Hispanics in 
Texas and California, and the recently mobile everywhere.12 
8 Even Jay Feinman refers to the United States at its founding as “the newly democratic” America. JAY M. FEINMAN,
UNMAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO ROLL BACK THE COMMON LAW 56 (2004).  
9 MACPHERSON, supra note 4, at 5. 
10 U.S. CONST. amend XIX.  Note that 12 of  the western territories along with New York extended the franchise to 
women before the Amendment. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 211-218, app. at 390 (Table A.20 States and Territories Fully Enfranchising 
Women Prior to the Nineteenth Amendment) (2001).   
11 Id at xvi. 
12 Id at 316. Universal suffrage is not a right enshrined on our constitution. 
5Part of the myth that the current rollback of torts is compatible with democracy is based 
on the misconception that the founding was democratic. However, the classical liberal state was 
not democratic and thus it should not be surprising that the common law and tort law were not 
supportive of democracy. The common law system largely presumed equality and freedom while 
exploiting the lack thereof, for example, by limiting access to courts for the poor, allowing those 
with superior bargaining power to bind and keep the gains of unequal power through contract 
and tort law and by providing remedies that replicated status quo inequalities. It was not until the 
early 1900s that tort law started its modern trend towards the expansion of liability, and this 
really did not take off, so to speak, until the 1960s.13 
The 1960s and 1970s were decades of considerable progress in civil and political rights 
as well as for socio-economic rights.14 These advances came from increased political 
participation, and from executive,15 legislative16 and judicial developments.17 They were also 
years in which our democracy was further consolidated through progressive reform of the 
common law in general and torts in particular.18 It was not mere coincidence that progressive 
 
13 FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 53.  
14 President Carter even signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1977, 
although it was never ratified by Congress, see http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.  
15 For instance, The War on Poverty which was introduced by Lyndon B. Johnson during his State of the Union 
address (Jan. 8, 1964), as well as proposed legislation which culminated in the Economic Opportunity Act and the 
Establishment of the Office of Economic Opportunity.   
16 See, e.g. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 
 Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 1, 78 Stat. 508 (1964); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title II, § 201, 78 Stat. 
243 (1964); Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 86-778, Title VII, § 701(a)-(e), 74 Stat. 992, 993 (1965); and 
The Age Discrimination Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2, 81 Stat. 602 (1967). Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title 
VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253. The EEOC obtained enforcement authority under the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972; Pub. 
L. No. 92-318, Title IX, 86 Stat. 235 (1972)) (Education Amendments prohibit sex discrimination in all aspects of 
education programs that receive federal money); The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 
Stat. 2076 (1978). 
17 For a list of landmark cases, see, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The 
American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, Appendix One: American 
Tort Law Timeline: 1200-2002 (2002 ).    
18 See section V. B infra. Although torts still reflected social inequalities, the reforms during the 60s provided easier 
access to courts and better protection for consumers.  Constitutional torts also emerged during this period, with 
6tort reform tracked the coming to age of our democracy. It was made possible by the democratic 
gains of the 1960s and 1970s and helped consolidate and protect those gains.  
Since the 1980s those democratic gains have been eroding. As Keyssar states, “Although 
the formal right to vote is now nearly universal, few observers would characterize the United 
States as a vibrant democracy.”19 In 2004 the American Political Science Association came out 
with its warning that American democracy was in peril.  They did so with the press release 
quoted at the beginning of this article,20 and through a set of reports commissioned by the 
Association.21 Those reports located the cause of this demise in the widening gap between rich 
and poor, as its authors state, “progress toward realizing the American ideals of democracy may 
have stalled, and in some arenas reversed” due to the broadening gap in income and wealth in 
America.22 
As our democracy appears to be on the decline, around the world, democracy seems to be 
on the rise. The late 1980s brought about a whole wave of democratic revolutions in Europe, 
Africa and Latin America.23 Arguably, the US has had a number of constitutional revolutions 
between the foundings and the present.24 Few, if any, would argue that these revolutions, past or 
 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
19 KEYSSAR, supra note 10 at 4, at 322. For the view that our democracy is crumbling based on current obstacles to 
voting see, SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER 
SUPPRESSION (2006). 
20 Press release, supra note 1. 
21 The task force compiled a series of reports in 2004: AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY;
THREE CRITICAL ANALYSES ON ECONOMIC, GENDER, RACIAL, AND ETHNIC INEQUALITIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS; and 
a set of teaching materials. Apsanet.org, Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy, 
http://www.apsanet.org/section_256.cfm (last visited July 9, 2006). These materials were edited into a book. 
INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN (Lawrence Jacobs & 
Theda Skocpol eds., 2005). 
22 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY 1 
(2004), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforcereport.pdf. 
23 See, e.g. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
(1993). 
24 According to Ackerman, the US has gone through three historical ruptures or transitions brought about by 
heightened democratic participation resulting in “higher law making”: the extra legal Founding which did not follow 
the procedures set out in the articles of Confederation, the 13th and 14th Reconstruction amendments which bypassed 
7present, have been as fundamental as those revolutions brought about by the third wave of 
democratization in the late 80s and early 90s.25 Even fewer would consider themselves to be in 
the throws of a revolution, or in the recent aftermath of such a revolution.26 Yet, a number of 
commentators have characterized the culmination of changes brought about by the Rehnquist 
Court over the last two decades in these very terms.27 Andrew Seigel recently noted that those 
commentating on the history of the Rehnquist Court are nearly uniform in their view that “… 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and his allies on the Court instigated a judicial "revolution" that has 
fundamentally altered both the substance of American law and the institutional arrangements 
through which we develop and enforce legal norms.”28 
the proper Article V procedures and the New Deal amendments which took place largely through the pressure 
brought to bear on the courts to switch in time in order to save the nine Supreme Court justices from having to share 
the bench with a few more judges. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 42-44 (1991). Contrary to 
these constitutional moments the current revolution is not a democratic moment of higher law making.   
25 See RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 206-209 (2002) (arguing that even our founding revolution was 
conservative compared to many of the legal transitions that took place around the world in the 90s). Our founding 
revolution was conservative because, contrary to popular belief, it did not establish a political system that was 
markedly different, in democratic terms, from the British system that preceded it.   
26 Perhaps we are now in a phase of consolidation. As Andrew Siegel puts it, “In rough cut, one might suggest that 
the years prior to 1994 represent rehearsal and experimentation with the agenda for the Rehnquist Revolution, the 
period from 1994 until 2002 or 2003, the years of the Revolution, and the years since then a period of consolidation 
or retrenchment.” Andrew Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Them in 
the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1112 (2006).   
27 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001). 
See also CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., THE REHNQUIST REVOLUTION IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, IN THE REHNQUIST 
COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 55 (2002); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term--
Foreword: We The Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 130 (2001); Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The 
Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 370 (2002) (critiquing the 
"federalism revolution"); cf. Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Court,
78 IND. L. J. 47, 49-52 (2003) ( taking a "modest" view of the Court's rulings); Dawn Johnson, Ronald Reagan and 
the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L. J. 363, 
364 (2003) (remaining agnostic about the “revolution”). 
28 Siegel, supra note 26, at 1100.  
8This “revolution” is routinely described in undemocratic terms. For instance, Jack Balkin 
and Sanford Levinson place the Court's contraction of congressional power at the core of this 
"constitutional revolution."29 Or, as Larry Kramer puts it, 
 
The defining characteristic of that Court is not its commitment to political 
conservatism nor a love of states' rights.… but … the Justices' conviction that 
they and they alone are responsible for the Constitution… [A]ny notion that what 
the Constitution does or permits might best be left for the people to resolve using 
the ordinary devices available to express their will seems beyond the Rehnquist 
Court's compass.30 
The “revolution” is undemocratic, both because of the usurpation of the power of 
Congress and the people and because of the erosion of mechanisms developed over time to hold 
government accountable and to keep democracy on track. According to Sylvia Law, the Supreme 
Court has limited the ability of Congress to address national problems to a degree only matched 
by the Lochner Court’s interference with attempts by Congress and the president to respond to 
the Great Depression. 31 
This includes: restricting the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate 
commerce, and to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment; expanding state 
immunity from federally defined claims of unfair labor practices and discrimination; and 
“rejecting settled interpretations of federal civil rights laws to limit the protection that Congress 
 
29 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 27, at 1045 (noting the revolution and criticizing the bare majority of the Court 
which has systematically reappraised the doctrines of federalism, racial equality, and civil rights, and who also gave 
the presidency to George W. Bush). 
30 Kramer, super note 27 at 158. 
31 Law, supra note 27, at 371. 
9has sought to give to the civil and economic rights of many vulnerable people, including older 
people, people with disabilities, women, and working people.”32 
It may come as little surprise that this judicial revolution also tracks the decline in 
American Democracy.  It may come as more of a surprise that both of these changes track the 
onslaught of regressive tort reform in the U.S. In part V below, we will look at the supporting 
role the Supreme Court has played in the regressive tort reform movement. This is not to say that 
the Supreme Court has played a leading role in this movement, but the mere fact that the 
Supreme Court is involved at all is notable.  It is testament to the fact that the present counter-
democratic changes that are taking place are not merely economic or political, or limited to broad 
public law areas like federalism. Rather, these changes are pervasive, cutting across the public 
and private law domains.  
There is very little written in the legal literature connecting tort reform to constitutional 
change, much less democratic change,33 although some have been arguing for years that tort law 
reflects and further entrenches the inequalities that exist in the U.S.,34 and numerous writers have 
 
32 Id. at  371-2. 
33 But see Jo Ellen Lind, "Procedural Swift": Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and Democratic Values 37 
AKRON L. REV. 717, 719 (2004) (arguing that federal legislation moving class actions into federal courts posses 
risks to the role of states in promoting the democratic values of political participation, transparency, and 
accountability); Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 533, 556 (1999) (arguing that in the confrontation between courts and legislators in the arena tort reform “that 
courts tend to be populist and deliberative, whereas legislatures tend to be captured by special interests, secretive, 
hasty, and unwilling or unable to offer reasons for their actions”); John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of 
Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) (arguing for a 
Constitutional Right to an adequate legal scheme for the redress of wrongs); George L. Priest, The Constitutionality 
of State Tort Reform Legislation and Lochner, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 683, 683 (2001).  There are many articles 
written on the subject of constitutional torts, see e.g., Thomas A. Eaton, Symposium: Re-examining First Principles: 
Deterrence and Corrective Justice in Constitutional Torts 35 GA. L. REV. 837 (2001); and for the relationship 
between state constitutions and tort law, see John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and 
American Tort Law 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159 (2005).   
34 The most prominent example is Richard Abel. See, e.g., Richard Abel, The Real Tort Crisis--Too Few Claims, 48 
OHIO ST. L. J. 443 (1987); Richard Abel, A Critique of American Tort Law, 8 BRITISH J. L. & SOC’Y 199-231 (1981) 
(Reprinted in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Allan Hutchinson ed., Rowman & Littlefield, 1989)); Richard Abel, 
General Damages are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea) 
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253 (2006).  See also Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort 
10
noted that tort reform has been a product of powerful corporate interest groups and a campaign 
of disinformation.35 Over the last 20 years, those inequalities have risen at unprecedented rates, 
and during that same period we have seen the erosion of civil and political rights, the dismantling 
of the welfare state and serious incursions into the rights of victims to access the courts and 
receive full compensation for the harms they suffer.  
 Michael L. Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig come very close to linking democracy and tort 
reform when they label the period from 1945 to 1980 “the Democratic Expansionary Era.”36 
Although the facts perhaps speak for themselves, Rustad and Koenig do not actually argue for, or 
explain why the period from 1945 to 1980 is an era of democratic expansion and they do not 
seem to fully appreciate or at least do not argue, that the current era is a period of democratic 
contraction. Jay Feinman also comes close to connecting the “un-making” of the common law to 
democratic decay.37 His first main point regarding the “Right’s” attack on the common law is 
that “…the law has dramatically changed to the detriment of ordinary people.”38 As he goes on 
to state, “To the extent that conservatives transform the common law, injury victims will find it 
 
Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (arguing that deep biases in tort law result in higher damage awards for white men than 
for women and minorities). 
35 See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages' Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1300 
(2005) (“The story of the punitive damages recoil is a familiar one about special legislation to help corporate 
America.” (Rustad also points to Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the Report of the Governor's Commission on Tort 
and Liability Insurance Reform, 53 TENN. L. REV. 679, 680 (1986) (punitive damages reform is about special 
legislation for corporate America) and John W. Wade, Strict Products Liability: A Look at its Evolution, THE BRIEF,
Fall 1989, at 8, 56 (tort reform should be unconstitutional because it is special interest legislation)).  See also Siegel, 
supra note 26 at 1147 (noting the substantial energies and resources spent by American businesses in their fight for 
constitutional protection against punitive damages); See also Abel, supra note 33; and FEINMAN, supra note 8.  For 
the view that the tort reform campaign is based on misinformation, see Abel, supra note 33; FEINMAN, supra note 10 
at 48, 190-192; and Rustad & Koenig, supra note 17. See also THOMAS BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 
(2005) (deconstructing the myths surrounding the calls for medical malpractice reform). For misinformation 
concerning punitive damages, see Eisenberg, infra note 245. 
36 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 17, at 4.  Nockleby & Curreri note that the first wave of tort neo-liberal tort reform 
began in the 1970s.  Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 1, at 1030-31. 
37 FEINMAN, supra note 8.  While Feinman places the blame on “radical conservatives,” “the right” and/or 
“Republicans,” the problem is more pervasive than that. The lack of responsiveness cuts across party lines. For 
examples of regressive legislation (including tort reform) and policies during the Clinton presidency see infra notes 
67, 77, and 216. 
38 FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 3. 
11
harder to get into court to sue wrongdoers who hurt them, harder to win when they get there, and 
harder to be adequately compensated for their injuries if they do win their suits.”39 
If commentators like Abel, Baker, Feinman, Rustad and others are correct, that the 
success of the regressive tort reform movement can be credited to political influence, power 
lobbying and “a campaign of misinformation [that] convinces people that reducing their rights is 
actually in their own interest,”40 then there is little room for question that the process behind this 
wave of tort reform is undemocratic.  As the argument in parts II-IV should make clear, 
regressive tort reform is a predictable outcome of the state of our democracy even without the 
“campaign of misinformation.” Nonetheless, this campaign of misinformation further erodes the 
democratic values of transparency and accountability, making it harder for truly democratic 
reforms to gain traction. 
To argue that the democratic gains of the 60s and 70s have come undone and that we are 
in a stage of consolidating plutocracy must sound radical, or like a conspiracy theory.41 This is, 
perhaps, because the average reader of law review articles (law professors, students, lawyers and 
the occasional business person or academic from another discipline) thinks he or she does, or 
could have, not only a stake in, but a voice in, our political system.42 While this may be true for 
some of these readers, it is not true for the majority of Americans.  
The idea that we are “the model” of democracy for the world is well entrenched in the 
American psyche. We often equivocate having the longest standing written Constitution with the 
 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 19 See also Lind, supra note 33, at 719; Abel, supra note 33, at 556; Goldberg, supra note 33; Priest, supra 
note 33, at 683; Eaton, supra note 33; Witt, supra note 33, 
41 The argument that follows does not depend on conspiracy theory nor any “radical” or socialist view of the state or 
democracy. 
42 It may be particularly difficult for law professors to imagine that they have little voice in American politics (see 
part III below on the impact of academics on political responsiveness).  
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idea that we are one of, if not the, longest established democracies.43 However, our democracy is 
very young. In order to rid ourselves of the illusion that we live in a thriving democracy, I will 
go into considerable detail to show just how large the gap is between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-
nots’ in our political and economic system, as well as how the rising inequality gap is bound up 
with losses in socio-economic and political stake, political voice, and losses in political 
responsiveness and accountability.44 The spiraling downward pressure of both socio-economic 
and political inequality has resulted in unresponsive legislation and policies, including tort 
reform, that is contrary to the needs and interests of the majority of Americans. Unlike the tort 
reform that helped consolidate our democracy in the 60s and 70s, the tort reform of the last two 
decades has acted to further entrench and consolidate oligarchy if not outright plutocracy. At 
times I will draw on contrasting trends in Europe to illustrate and support these points.  
 
II INEQUALITY: ECONOMIC 
For a short time, the impact of hurricane Katrina on the people of New Orleans brought 
American inequality into sharp relief. As one commentator wrote, “Katrina’s whirlwind has laid 
bare the fault lines of race and class in America. For a lightning moment, the American psyche 
was singed.”45 There appeared to be some hope that “the shock and shame” of Katrina might 
“strip away the old evasions, hypocrisies and not-so-benign neglect” surrounding issues of 
 
43 Thirteen countries extended the franchise to women before the United States. 
http://ap.grolier.com/article?assetid=0279670-0&templatename=/article/article.html 
44 In spite of the fact that surveys are somewhat biased against those with egalitarian views, Schlozman et al’s 
survey results revealed substantial pro-egalitarian sentiments. KAY L. SCHLOZMAN ET. AL., INEQUALITIES OF 
POLITICAL VOICE 12-13 (2004), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/voicememo.pdf.  Those pro-egalitarian sentiments 
are much stronger when it comes to the preferences of Americans for political equality than for economic quality. 
Id. at 11. 
45 Johnathan Tilove, “Our Society is So Uneven”: Katrina Exposes Inequalities of Race, Wealth, TRENTON TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2005, at B1. 
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inequality in America.46 The overwhelming racial dimension to the impact of the hurricane no 
doubt further accentuated the contrast between the ‘haves’ and the majority of African-American 
‘have-nots’. These socio-economic inequalities gave rise to fears of gross political inequality as 
significant worries of disenfranchisement abounded in the lead up to the first city elections since 
the hurricane, given the large numbers of poor African-Americans who were resettled outside the 
city.47 By the time of this publication most Americans will have tired and forgotten about 
hurricane Katrina and New Orleans. No doubt most politicians have.  
However inconvenient it might be, gross inequality is not limited to New Orleans and 
other areas of drastic natural disaster. Inequality is pervasive in our country. As Table 1 
illustrates, the statistics on inequality show that among rich western nations we “have the highest 
level of inequality by far.48 We have the largest decile ratio gap (the gap between the lowest 10% 
in relation to the median income and the highest 10% in relation to the median income)49 and the 
highest Gini coefficient gap (the Gini coefficient measures equality across all income 
distributions).50 No other economically advanced state approximates our decile ratio and our 
 
46 Jonathan Alter, The Other America, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 42-48; Larry Bartels, Is the Water Rising? 
Reflections on Inequality and American Democracy, 39 PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS 39 (2006).  “Many 
Americans were shocked and shamed by the televised images of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina…. 
Thousands of residents, mostly Black and poor, seemed to be trapped in a Hobbesian state of nature, abandoned by 
government and civilized society. ” Bartels, supra note 46, at 46.  
47 See, e.g. Marc Morano, Voter Disenfranchisement Predicted in New Orleans (March 09, 2006) CNSNews.com 
available at: 
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewPolitics.asp?Page=%5CPolitics%5Carchive%5C200603%5CPOL20060309a.html; 
Jesse Jackson, Secret rolls undermine N. Orleans vote, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, available at suntimes.com. 
48 Andrea Brandolini & Timothy M. Smeeding, Patterns of Economic Inequality in Western Democracies: Some 
Facts on Level and Trends, in 39 PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS 21, 23 (2006); See also Id. at 22, Figure 1.   
49 In the U.S. , the numbers were 39% in the bottom 10th percentile and 210 in the top 10th percentile. This means 
that the population in the bottom 10% income group receive only 39% of the median income while the top 10% 
receive 210% of the median income. This results in a decile ratio in which the top 10% income group receive 5.45 
times what the bottom group receives.      
50 Id. at 22. The US CIA fact book put the U.S. at 45 for 2004 with a 2004 estimate of 12% of the population below 
the poverty line.  CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html (last 
visited June 6, 2006). 
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lowest 10% are significantly worse off than their European counterparts.51 Since WWII this gap 
has widened at a pace and to a degree unmatched by other economically advanced countries.52 
Table 1  
Economic Inequality: Lowest 10% compared to medium income; Highest 10% compared to 
Medium; the Decile ratio of P90/P10; and the Gini Coefficient.53 
COUNTRIES P10 P90 P90/P10 GINI 
Luxembourg 
2000 
66% 215% 3.257576 0.26 
Finland 2000 57% 164% 2.877193 0.247 
Norway 2000 57% 159% 2.789474 0.251 
Sweden 2000 57% 168% 2.947368 0.252 
Netherlands 1999 56% 167% 2.982143 0.248 
Austria 2000 55% 173% 3.1455 0.26 
Switzerland 2000 54% 182% 3.3704 0.28 
France 1994 54% 191% 3.5370 0.288 
Denmark 1992 54% 155% 2.8704 0.263 
Germany 2000 54% 173% 3.2037 0.252 
Belgium 2000 53% 174% 3.2830 0.277 
Canada 2000 48% 188% 3.9167 0.302 
United Kingdom 
1999 
47% 215% 4.5745 0.345 
Italy 2000 44% 199% 4.5227 0.333 
Spain 2000 44% 209% 4.75 0.34 
Ireland 2000 41% 189% 4.6098 0.323 
United States 
2000 
39% 210% 5.3846 0.369 
Average 51.76% 184% 3.65 0.287647 
Average w/o U.S. 52.56% 183% 3.54 0.282563 
51 Brandolini & Smeeding, supra note 48, at 22, Figure 1, available at http//www.lisproject.org/keyfigures. 
Converting these numbers to a standard curve might bring them into perspective. The standard deviation for the 
Decile ratio is 0.812 and thus the US ratio of 5.38 is over 2 standard deviations away from the average of 3.65.The 
Gini coefficient is likewise over 2 standard deviations from the average. On the decile score, the U.S. is almost a full 
standard deviation away from the next worst group of performing countries (i.e.  Spain, Ireland, the U.K. and Italy). 
Thus, while these countries are in the C- to D range the U.S. is alone in the F range of the curve.   
52 Lawrence Jacobs & Theda Skocpol, Restoring the Tradition of Rigor and Relevance to Political Science, in  39 
PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS 27 (2006) (referring to L MISHEL ET. AL, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 
(2005)). See also Brandolini & Smeedling, supra note 48, at 25, figures 3 & 4. Jacobs and Skocpol report that as of 
2003 the most affluent fifth of the population received 47.6% of family income while the top 5% received 21% of 
that income.  Jacobs & Skocpol, supra note 21. 
53 Brandolini & Smeeding, supra note 48, at 22 Figure 1. 
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Stand. Deviation 6.94 
 
19.83 
 
0.812 
 
0.040 
 
The inequality in America is not merely due to market based inequalities but also due to a 
lack of intervention to mitigate the inequalities generated by the market.54 As Table 2 shows, the 
Market based Gini coefficients between these 13 states and the U.S. do not significantly diverge. 
However, market interventions by way of taxes and benefits significantly dampen the disparity 
between the rich and poor in most of these countries. The resulting post reduction coefficients 
reveal significant disparities between the U.S. and these western countries. While the average 
reduction is over 30%, the reduction in the U.S. is about 20%. In those countries where the 
reduction percentages approximate our numbers, the pre- benefit Gini coefficient is significantly 
lower than our own. For instance, Switzerland’s pre-benefit Gini coefficient is nearly as low as 
our post-benefit Gini coefficient.   
 
Table 2  
Inequality of Market Income and Disposable Income: Gini Coefficients before and after taxes 
and benefits55 
Mkt 
Gini 
after ben reducti
on 
Finland 38 25 34% 
Netherlands 39 25 36% 
Sweden 45 25 44% 
Austria 43 26 39% 
Germany 46 26 42% 
Belgium 47 28 41% 
France 49 29 47% 
54 Lane Kenworthy & Jonas Pontusson, Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Affluent Countries, in 
3 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 449 (2005) available at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~lkenwor/pop2005.pdf (last visited June 
13, 2006). This data does not reflect government spending on infrastructure, the military, or the civil and criminal 
justice system, which provide a disproportionate benefit to businesses and the wealthy. 
55 Table based on data extracted from A Brandolini & T Smeedling Figure 2 (based on the Luxemburg Income 
Study).  Brandolini & Smeedling, supra note 48, at Figure 2.    
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Canada 41 30 27% 
Switzerland 39 30 20% 
Ireland 44 32 27% 
Italy 46 33 27% 
Spain 47 34 28% 
United Kingdom 50 35 31% 
United States 47 37 22% 
Average 44.36 29.64% 33.21%
The data on Gini coefficient reduction through taxes and benefits does not include 
pensions or the public provisions of services such as education or health care, even though low 
or no cost provision of these benefits greatly reduces consumption inequality.56 Because 
educational provisions in most states in the U.S. are still based on local property values the 
distribution of this service entrenches and exacerbates the above inequalities within the U.S. No 
other country finances education in this way.57 There is also a significant gap in the provision of 
health care between the U.S. and other O.E.C.D. countries which significantly exacerbates the 
disposable income gap.58  This has a significant impact on those who are uninsured or under-
insured.59 To bring this home, between 1973 and 2000, the income of the bottom 90% of U.S. 
tax payers fell by 7 percent while the income of the top 1% grew by 14 percent.60 
56 Kenworthy & Pontusson, supra note 54, at 455. 
57 Allan Odden & William H. Clune, School Finance Systems: Aging Structures in Need of Renovation, 20 EDEC.
EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 157, 168-69 (1998).  For the intersection of law, race and education see Samuel R. 
Lucas & Marcel Paret, Annual Reviews, 1 ANNUAL REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 203 (2005), 
http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/eprint/znK7y9nbHQND7hyTuGfb/full/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.041604.115
931?cookieSet=1.  For facts on educational attainment by race SEE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, KAISER FAMILY 
FOUNDATION FACT SHEET: YOUNG AFRICAN AMERICAN MEN IN THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.kff.org/minorityhealth/upload/7541.pdf (last visited July 27, 2006). 
58 Although we spend twice as much for health care than most O.E.C.D. countries, most of the burden is born by the 
private sector. While the average O.E.C.D. country public expenditure on health as a percentage of total spending on 
health has consistently been over 70% (1980- 2005), the United States has averaged between 40% and 45% from 
1980 to 2005. See OECD Health Data 2006 - Frequently Requested Data: Data on Public Expenditure on Health, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/49/35529832.xls (last visited July 27, 2006).  
59 For information on the uninsured see, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE GROWING UNINSURED POPULATION AND 
THE HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET, http://www.kff.org/uninsured/profile.cfm. For statistics on provision of health care 
by race, see KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 57.  Insurance coverage may have a significant impact on law 
suits. As Reisman states, “where consumers are heavily insured but manufacturers and sellers go bare, there will be 
fewer product liability actions than in a jurisdiction where victims have little coverage but businesses hold large 
policies.” Mathias Reisman, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: 
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Further, contrary to the belief of a majority of Americans, our chances of moving up the 
economic ladder are not as good as they were 30 years ago. 61 For instance, sons from the 
bottom three quarters of the socio-economic scale were less likely to move up in the 1990s than 
had sons in the 1960s.62 What is perhaps more troubling is that household income inequality 
increased while those working within the household also increased.63 Without the contribution of 
wives, the income of the bottom fifth would have decreased by 13.9% between 1979 and 2000 
rather than raising by 7.5%.64 
III DEMOCRACY AND INEQUALITY: BEING HEARD 
As early as 1955, Kuznet described the relationship between inequality and economic 
development in democratic terms. In that work he stated,  
 
In democratic societies the growing political power of the urban lower-income 
groups led to a variety of protective and supporting legislation, much of it aimed 
to counteract the worst effects of rapid industrialization and urbanization and to 
 
Emergence of a Worldwide Standard? 51 AM. J. COMP. L.  751, 827 (2003). See also Jane Stapleton, Products 
Liability in the United Kingdom: The Myths of Reform, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 45, 47 (1999) (“the [British] National 
Health Service has in the past operated to relieve most tortfeasors from the costs of their victims' medical 
treatment.”).  
60 Heather Boushey & Christian E. Weller, Inequality and Household Economic Hardship 5 (United Nations Dep’t 
of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Working Paper  No. 18, April 2006). 
61 See e.g., Janny Scott & David Leonhardt, Class Matters: Shadowy Lines that Still Divide N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/15/national/class/OVERVIEW-
FINAL.html?ex=1273809600&en=2fb756e388191419&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.  The New York Times 
poll indicated that over 75% of Americans thought that the chances of moving up the economic ladder were as good 
or better than they were 30 years ago.  Interactive Graphic, How Class Works, 
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/national/20050515_CLASS_GRAPHIC/index_03.html. 
62 Boushey & Weller, supra note 60, at 6 (citing Earl Wysong, Robert Perrucci, & David Wright, Organizations, 
Resources, and Class Analysis: The Distributional Model and the U.S. Class Structure (Ind. U. Working Paper, 
2004) (comparing the incomes and occupations of 2,749 fathers and sons from the 1970s to the late 1990s)). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. The top fifth of incomes was not as heavily impacted by women entering the job market as was the bottom.  
Wives in families with children in the bottom fifth increased their working hours by 43.9% as compared to only a 
27.4% increase in working hours among wives in the top fifth. Id. 
18
support the claims of the broad masses for adequate shares of the growing income 
of the country.65 
However, in recent years lower income groups have failed to secure such protective and 
supporting legislation, and the legislation that is on the books has been scaled back, and under-
enforced,66 leaving the poor and lower income groups to the vicissitudes of the market.67 This 
means that either Kuznet was incorrect, or that we are not a democratic society.68 
The impact of the gap between the ‘haves’ and have-nots’ on our democracy is explored 
in detail in the American Political Science Association task force Reports on Inequality and 
American Democracy.69 As two of the authors state: 
 
[The report] concluded that the privileged participate more than others and are 
increasingly well organized to press their demands on government. Public 
officials, in turn, are much more responsive to the privileged than to average 
citizens and the least affluent. Citizens with lower or moderate incomes speak 
with a whisper that is lost on the ears of inattentive government officials, while 
 
65 Simon Kuznet, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 17 (1955). 
66 One example that resonates with tort reform is the E.E.O.C. See, e.g., Marni Goldberg, Job-Discrimination Claims 
Pile Up With Budget Cuts, CHI. TRIBUNE, June 17, 2006, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-
eeoc17jun17,1,7666899.story?coll=la-headlines-nation (The claims backlog at the EEOC, which has lost 20% of its 
staff since 2001, grew 12% last year resulting in a backlog of over 33,000 claims; the backlog is expected to grow to 
48,000 by 2007 while Bush is proposing another 4 million dollar reduction in funding).  
67 For instance Bill Clinton’s Welfare Reform of 1996 removed many important features of the U.S. welfare safety 
net. See TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 14 (2004) 
(referenced hereafter as TASK FORCE—HACKER),  http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/feedbackmemo.pdf.  As Thomas 
Piketty and Emmanuel Saez note in Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, CXVIII THE Q. J. OF ECON.
1, 1-2 (2003), “Kuznet’s curve is widely held to have doubled back on itself, especially in the United States, with the 
period of falling inequality observed during the first half of the twentieth century being succeeded by a very sharp 
reversal of the trend since the 1970s.”   
68 Or, we are in a new industrial revolution (ie the computer revolution ).  See Piketty & Saez, supra note 67, at 2, 
24.  
69 TASK FORCE REPORTS, supra note 21.  
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the advantaged roar with a clarity and consistency that policymakers readily hear 
and routinely follow.70 
According to some studies, the poorest 1/3 of Americans have virtually no influence on 
national legislation and the bottom 2/3 have less than half the influence of the top 1/3.71 Bartels 
summarized his unpublished findings from the 101st congress of 1989 to the 103rd congress of 
1994 to show that while there was a good deal of responsiveness to middle and high income 
constituents, senators completely ignored constituents in the bottom third economic bracket.72 
The figures are stark, with nearly twice as much responsiveness being shown for high income 
constituents than for middle income constituents and absolutely no weight given to the lower 1/3 
of the population.73 One may have expected that this would hold true for Republican members of 
congress, given the stereotype that Republicans are for the rich while Democrats are for the 
poor.74 Bartles’ statistics do in fact show that Republicans are nearly twice as responsive to the 
views of wealthy constituents as are Democrats.75 While one might expect that Democrats would 
spread their responsiveness between the middle and lower income constituent, they in fact split 
their responsiveness nearly 50/50 between middle and high income constituents and, like 
 
70 Jacobs & Skocpol, supra note 21, at 27.  See also Kay Lehman Schlozman, On Inequality and Political Voice: 
Response to Stephen Earl Bennett’s Critique, in 39 PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS 55, 56 (2006) (referring to 
SCHLOZMAN ET. AL., supra note 44, at 30-33). 
71 Bartels, supra note 46, at 40; See also Stephen Macedo & Christopher Karpowitz, The Local Roots of Inequality,
39 PS: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICS 59, 60 (2006); Larry M. Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political 
Representation (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Princeton University), 
www.princeton.edu/~bartels/economic.pdf; Martin Gilens, Public Opinion and Democratic Responsiveness: Who 
Gets What they Want from Government? (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Princeton University), 
http://www.princeton.edu/~csdp/events/pdfs/Gilens.pdf.  See also Martian Gilens, discussing Public Opinion and 
Democratic Responsiveness: Who Gets What they Want from Government? at The Center for Study of Democratic 
Politics, Princeton University, conference on Global Inequality (Nov. 7-8, 2003). 
72 Bartels, supra note 46, at 40. 
73See id. at 40, Figure 1. 
74 Although there is some truth to the former assertion, Bartels’ work shows that there is little truth the latter 
assertion.  
75 Bartels, supra note 71, at 20-24; Tables 4-6 at 44-46 and Figure 3 at 53. 
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Republicans, are completely unresponsive to low income constituents.76 This view is supported 
by historians of voting and by former democratic cabinet members. As Alexander Keyssar notes 
in his work on the history of voting in America, Democrats have spent more energy courting 
suburban swing votes and trying to keep Wall Street happy than trying to mobilize the masses of 
poor non-voters.77 
Bartels also noted that the unpublished work of Martin Gilens supported his finding.78 
Gilens has since published his expanded research and the results are even more startling.79 
Although he found a moderately strong relationship between what the public wants and what the 
government does,80 he also found that when Americans with different income levels had 
differing policy preferences the policy outcomes strongly reflected the preferences of the most 
affluent but not those of poor or even middle-income Americans.81 Thus, Gilens’ published work 
goes much further than questioning whether our democratic system works for the poor to 
whether our society can be characterized as democratic at all.  
Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page found similar results when it came to U.S. foreign 
relations. 82 These authors tested the impact of four different factors on U.S. foreign policy 
(public opinion, labor, members of epistemic communities (educators and leaders of private 
 
76 The actual ratio is 54/46, and thus Democrats can boast that they are moderately more the party of the middle 
class than of the upper class (Bartels, supra note 71, at 53, Figure 3). 
77 KEYSSAR, supra note 10, at 4, 321. Keyssar also refers to the work of Robert Reich, Clinton’s secretary of labor 
(ROBERT B. REICH, LOCKED IN THE CABINET (1997)) noting that Reich’s memoirs have a number of references to 
the fact that the Clinton administration’s political strategies subordinated social policy to the preferences of Wall 
Street. KEYSSAR, supra note 10, at 4, 321. 
78 Bartels, supra note 46, at 40; (referring to Gilens, supra note 71). 
79 He has almost doubled his data set from 754 to 2000 questions and expanded the years from 1992 to 1998 to 
between 1981 and 2002. Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUBLIC OPINION 
QUARTERLY 778-796 (2005). Note that these years substantially overlap with the Rehnquist Court and with the 
beginning of regressive tort reform. 
80 He notes, however that even with proposed changes receiving 90% public support there is only a 46% chance the 
policy makers will adopt the policy. Gilens, supra note 71, at 786 
81 See Gilens, supra note 71, at 788-789. 
82 Lawrence R. Jacobs & Benjamin I Page, Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 107 (2005). 
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foreign policy organizations and think tanks[hereinafter experts]), and business).83 They used 
four different types of regression models and found that under the four models, business was by 
far the most dominant influence on U.S. foreign policy (across the House, the Senate and the 
executive/ administration).84 Public opinion, had virtually no impact,85 and the impact of experts 
was dubious.86 It was unclear whether their opinions were causes or effects of the views of 
policy makers,87 and how much of their views were the product of the influence of business and 
labor.88 If the impact of business and labor, on expert opinions is plugged into their analysis, the 
impact of business on foreign policy raises from .52 to just over .70 while the impact of labor 
raises from .16 to about .29.89 While labor has some impact, it is still dwarfed by the impact of 
business.   
The results of this study again bring into question democratic responsiveness and 
accountability.90 If public opinion has little to no influence on foreign policy, the real impact of 
experts is dubious and business has two to three times the impact of labor, then one must 
question the true vitality of our democracy. Given the standards articulated above, these signs of 
non-responsiveness and grossly unequal responsiveness threaten democracy conceived in these 
terms.91 
83 Id. at 110. 
84 Id. at 114-117. 
85 Id. at 114, table 1, 115, table 2 and 3, and 116, table 4. 
86 Id. at 117, 114, table 1, 115, table 2 and 3, and 116, table 4. 
87 Id. at 117.   
88 Id. at 119.  
89 Id. at 119 and see id. at 120, table 5. For a treatment of this phenomenon in the context of tort reform, see. 
FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 175. 
90 The authors note that their finding may have troubling normative implications for “adherents to democratic theory 
who advocate substantial government responsiveness to the reasoned preferences of citizens.” Id. at 121 (referring to 
such adherents as ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989) and BENJAMIN PAGE & ROBERT SHAPIRO,
THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF TRENDS IN AMERICA’S POLICY PREFERENCES (1992). 
91 Bartels, supra note 46, at 39.  
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IV PARTICIPATION: HAVING NO VOICE 
Social scientist have identified voter turnout as the potential cause of both the failure to 
alleviate the inequality gap92 and the failure to respond to lower income constituencies.93 Others 
have argued that affluence and actual contact with politicians or the lack thereof may be more 
significant in determining the responsiveness of politicians to different constituencies.94 
According to Kenworthy and Pontusson,  the median-voter model predicts that with 
increases in market inequality the distance between median and mean income increases (the 
mean or average wage goes up more than the wage in the middle, or median wage) and as a 
result support for government spending increases and thus the inequality gap is narrowed.95 As 
documented above, while the model works in Europe, it has failed in the U.S. How do we 
account for the failure? One viable explanation for the why Europe does and we do not close the 
gap is voter turnout. In the countries surveyed by Kenworthy and Pontusson the differences in 
responsiveness to inequalities roughly track voter turn-out rates.96 In other words, the higher the 
voter turnout, the more redistribution from rich to poor.97 
A. Voter turnout: the most egalitarian form of political participation 
 
92 Kenworthy & Pontusson, supra note 54, at 456-461, 459 (emphasize added), 462, Figure 9. This is the 
contemporary variant of Kuznet’s work cited above. Kuznet, supra note 65. 
93 John Griffin & Brian Newman, Are Voters Better Represented, 67 J. POL. 1206 (2005). 
94 Bartels, supra note 71, at 26-27.  
95 Kenworthy & Pontusson, supra note 65, at 456 (referring to Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard, A Rational Theory of 
the Size of Government, 89 J. POL. ECON. 914 (1981). 
96 Kenworthy & Pontusson, supra note 54, at 459, 462, Figure 9. 
97 Compare table 2, supra at 10 and table 3, infra at 16. The explanation is strengthened in the U.S. case by the data 
presented below, which shows that the poor have much lower voter turnout rates than those in the middle class and 
above. 
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The average voter turnout for elections in the 16 countries in table 3 is about 76%.98 
Although the 2004 U.S. national elections saw a somewhat respectable turnout of almost 60%, 
that number was unusually high for U.S national elections.99 The average turnout for U.S. 
congressional elections from 1945 to 2001 was 48%, which is quite low compared to the 
average.  The turnout at local elections tends to hover at about 30% and below.100 Statistics 
collected by Michael P. McDonald from state elections from 1980-2004 show voter participation 
rates from between 47% and 50%.101 Even if state officials are responsive to voters, these 
numbers call into question the democratic pedigree of state legislative tort reform. 
 
Table 3 VAP statistics by country 
Country VAP 
Parliamentary 
voter turnout 
1945-2001 
Italy 92% 
Belgium 85% 
Austria 84% 
Sweden 84% 
Netherlands 84% 
Denmark 84% 
98 Derived from statistics of averages of voting age population ratios across 169 countries in parliamentary elections 
from 1945-2001 compiled by the International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance.  Rafael López 
Pintor et. al., Voter Turnout Rates From a Comparative Perspective, in VOTER TURNOUT SINCE 1945: A GLOBAL 
REPORT 75, 83-84 (2002), http://www.idea.int/publications/vt/upload/Voter%20turnout.pdf.  Note that not only are 
we significantly below every other country on this list, we rank 139th out the 169 countries in the survey.  Id. 
99 The U.S. census report puts the number higher because it excludes those people of voting age who are not eligible 
to vote like certain immigrants and felons/ ex felons. U.S. Dept. of Com., Econ. and Stat. Admin., U.S. Census 
Bureau, Voting and Registration in the November 2004 Election: Population Characteristics 1 (March 2006), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p20-556.pdf (written by Kelly Holder) (Hereafter known as “Census 
Bureau—Holder”).  
100 Macedo & Karpowitz, supra note 71, at 59-60 (referring to STEPHEN MACEDO ET. AL., DEMOCRACY AT RISK:
HOW POLITICAL CHOICES UNDERMINE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 66 (2005) and 
Zoltan Hajnal & Jessica Trounstine, Where Turnout Matters: The Consequences of Uneven turnout in City Politics,
67 J. POL. 515 (2005), as well as others). 
101 United States Election Project, Voter Turnout Statistics, Turnout 1980-2006, 
http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout%201980-2006.xls.  See also Michael P. McDonald, State Turnout Rates Among 
Those Eligible to Vote, 1980-2000, 2 ST. POL. AND POL’Y Q. 1999 (2002).   
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Canada 83% 
Germany 80% 
Norway 79% 
Finland 78% 
Spain 76% 
Ireland 75% 
United Kingdom 74% 
France 67% 
Luxembourg 64% 
Switzerland 52% 
United States 48% 
Average 76% 
Writing prior to the 2000 elections, Alexander Keyssar noted that historically, low voter 
turnout correlated with class and education and that “the people who are least likely to be content 
and complacent (and most likely to need government help) are those who are least likely to 
vote.”102 This debunks the idea that Americans don’t vote because they are generally content. He 
goes on to state that low voter turnout persists among the same groups to whom the franchise 
was limited throughout much of our history, namely, the poor, the young, certain minorities and 
those with less education—i.e. the ‘have-nots.’103 
These observations were borne out in the 2004 elections. Those in the over $50,000 
income bracket had a 77% voter turnout as opposed to those making less than $20,000, who had 
a 48% voter turnout.104 The poor were greatly overrepresented among non-voters while those 
making over $100,000 a year are greatly underrepresented among non-voters. 105 The employed 
had a 66% turnout as opposed to a 50% turnout for the unemployed.106 Those with Bachelor’s 
 
102 KEYSSAR, supra note 10, at 321. 
103 Id. The notable exception is women. Census Bureau—Holder, supra note 113, at 2.
104 Census Bureau—Holder, supra note 99, at 5. The income based statistics stop at $100,000 and over and so it is 
difficult to know what the numbers are like for the very wealthy. 
105 Id. at 10, table C. 
106 Id. at 5. 
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degrees had about twice the voter turnout as those without high school degrees (78% vs. 40%).107 
Those in the 18-24 year old bracket who do not have a high school degree had a rate of under 
25% while those in the same bracket with college degrees had a 67% rate.108 Non-Hispanic white 
citizens had turnout rates at 67% while black citizens were at 60%, Hispanic citizens at 47% and 
Asian citizens at 44%.109 
As one might predict, the increase in voter turnout for the 2004 election was not due to 
higher turnout rate from Blacks, Asians, Hispanics or from the poor, but from non-Hispanic 
whites who increased their turnout from 60.5% in 2000 to 67% in 2004 and those making over 
$50,000 per year who increased their turnout from 72% in 2000 to 77% in 2004.110 
As noted above, voter turnout has also been used to explain the closely related 
phenomenon of a lack of responsiveness. Griffin and Newman found that voters are better 
represented than non-voters.111 Given that the middle and upper income groups have better voter 
turnout rates than the poor this may account for at least some of the difference in responsiveness.  
There is a whole host of explanations for why certain minorities, the poor, and uneducated have 
such low voter turnouts. Those explanations include: 
• lack of stake in the system (little to gain), 112 
• the complex non-user-friendly procedures,113 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 6. 
109 Id. at 7.  
110 Compare Census Bureau—Holder, supra note 99 with U.S. Dept. of Com., Econ. and Stat. Admin., U.S. Census 
Bureau, Voting and Registration in the November 2000 Election: Population Characteristics 3, 5 (Feb. 2002), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p20-542.pdf. (written by Jamieson, et. al.) (Here after known as “Census 
Bureau—Jamieson, et. al.).  
111 Griffin & Newman, supra note 93. 
112 Clinton’s own secretary of labor said that “the great mass of non-voters … didn’t vote in 1996 because they saw 
nothing in it for them.”  REICH, supra note 77, at 330. 
113 KEYSSAR, supra note 10, at 321; see also MARTIN WATTENBERG, WHERE HAVE ALL THE VOTERS GONE? 162 
(2002). Wattenberg finds it impressive how good our turnout is given how complicated our process is compared to 
other countries. Id. 
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• conflicts with work, school or childcare obligations,114 
• the fact that voting is not mandatory,115 and   
• the fact that we have a two party system, under which neither party caters to the interests 
of the poor.116 
If elected officials were concerned about the groups that have such low voter turnout, a 
number of simple reforms would make it easier to go to the polls. As common sense suggests, 
given that those who do not vote did not elect the people currently in office, there is not much 
incentive for those in office to enact reforms to bring them to the polls.117 
Setting aside the problems created by our two party system,118 which would be difficult, 
both practically and politically, to change, many other changes would be simple, for instance: 
making ballets less complicated,119 making elections mandatory,120 making election day a 
 
114 This is because our elections are held during the work week  and not on a public holiday. See WATTENBERG,
supra note 113, at 169-71. Wattenberg notes that in President Clinton’s last official message to Congress he wrote, 
“We should declare election day a national holiday so that no one has to choose between their responsibilities at 
work and their responsibilities as a citizen.” Id. at 170-71 (citing William Jefferson Clinton, 42th President of the 
United States, The Unfinished Work of Building One America, Message to Congress (Jan. 15, 2001)). 
115 In the 9 countries where compulsory voting is enforced, the turnout rate is over 85% compared to nearly 75% in 
the 10 states that do not enforce their mandatory voting laws. Compare this to the average of approximately 68% for 
the remaining 147 states that do not have compulsory voting.  Pintor, et. al., supra note 98. 
116 KEYSSAR, supra note 10, at 321. As he further notes, Clinton’s own secretary of labor said that “the great mass of 
non-voters … didn’t vote in 1996 because they saw nothing in it for them.” Id. See also REICH, supra note 77, at 
330. 
117 Here, the democratic process has very little hope of correcting itself.  
118 See e.g. AREND LIJPHART, PATTERS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX 
DEMOCRACIES (1999); see also Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed 
Systems, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 297 (1997) (Special issue: Contrasting Political Institutions), available at 
http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/gpa/wang_files/Dem09.pdf. 
119 Wattenberg notes that in Europe there are generally much fewer choices to make on ballots, making them much 
easier to complete. WATTENBERG, supra note 113, at 166.  
120 See Pintor, et. al., supra note 98; see also WATTENBERG, supra note 113, at 164; and Arend Lijphart, Unequal 
Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1997). Note that compulsory voting 
laws do not require that one actually vote, but they do require that one show up to vote unless one has an appropriate 
excuse or justification for not doing so. WATTENBERG, supra note 113, at 164. 
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national holiday,121 putting it on a weekend,122 or simply extending the hours.123 These would 
significantly improve democratic participation.  
 
B. Other more stratified forms of political participation 
 
Bartles tested the hypothesis that voter turnout was the cause of lack of responsiveness 
along with a few other contenders, e.g., ‘political knowledge’ and ‘contact with senators and/or 
staff’ and found the latter (contact with senators and/or staff) to have the most significant impact 
on responsiveness.124 By comparing his work with Sidney Verba’s, he was also able to roughly 
test the hypothesis that campaign contributions impacted on responsiveness, and found that in 
two of the eight issue areas the projected disparities in responsiveness matched the disparities in 
income contribution while in the others, the disparities did not quite match the dollar for dollar 
disparities although, unsurprisingly, they did tend in the same direction.125 
Despite low voter turnout rates, voters are the most numerous and most representative 
group of political activists.126 At the other end of the representative spectrum are campaign 
contributors, who are the least representative.127 85% of those making a donation to a 
presidential candidate of over $1,000 had at least a BA, and 95% of the substantial donors to 
presidential candidates in 2000 made over $100,000.128 The race, sex and age discrepancies in 
donations of over $200 to presidential candidates reflect similar discrepancies, with 96% of 
 
121 WATTENBERG, supra note 113, at 170-71. 
122 Id.at 169. 
123 Id. at 172 (drawing on the Japanese experience). 
124 Bartels, supra note 71, at 24-29, 47, Table 7. 
125 Id. at 28-29 (using SIDNEY VERBA ET. AL., VOICE AND INEQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 194, 565(1995)  
126 SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 22, 38, Table 3.  
127 Id. at 22. 
128 Id. at 22. This group comprised only 12% of the population. Id. 
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donations coming from Whites, 70% coming from males and over 99% of donations coming 
from those over 30. Those in the 18-30 bracket contributed only 1% while those over age 46 
contributed 83%.129 
Looking across the spectrum of participation, the statistics show that those making over 
$75,000 per year are between two and six times more likely to participate in politics through 
campaign work, direct contact, protests, affiliation with political organizations, informal 
community activities, and campaign contributions than those making under $75,000 per year.130 
Those making over $75,000 per year have approximately twice as much direct contact as those 
making under $75,000 per year. The numbers are not as drastic for race, but they do show 
significant disparities between Whites, African Americans and Latinos.131 The discrepancy in 
political activity between those in the 18-24 age range and those in the ranges of 24-49 and 50-
59 was about 1-2.132 
Education, is a central element in the relationship between socio-economic status and 
participation because it affects many other determinants of socio-economic status as well as the 
other determinants of participation, e.g. job, income, knowledge, civic and organizational skills, 
as well as connections with other politically active people who are more likely to enlist their aid 
in political activities.133 
129 Id. at 38 table 3. 
130 Id. at 23, Figure 1.  Class based stratification affects the entire range of political activities.  KEYSSAR, supra note 
10, at 321-322 (referring to VERBA, ET. AL., supra note 125, at 1-13, 23-24, 511-33).  “The affluent and well-
educated are not only able to afford the financial costs of organizational support but they are in a better position to 
command the skills, acquire the information, and utilize connections that are helpful in getting an organization off 
the ground or keeping it going.” SCHLOZMAN ET. AL., supra note 44, at 20. 
131 Gilens, supra note 71,at 24, Table 2. See also Id. at 24, Figure 3. In terms of mean number of political activities 
Anglo-White men had 2.36 compared to 1.94 for Black men and 1.61 for Latino men. Among women, Whites had 
2.08, Black’s 1.86, and Latinas .9. Id. 
132 Id. at 25, Figure 4.  It shows 1.26 political acts performed by those in the 18-24 age range compared with 2.17 in 
the 30-39 range, 2.54 in the 40-49 range, 2.52 in the 50-59 range, 2.35 for 60-69, with the numbers understandably 
dropping off for those over 70 to 1.82.  
133 Id. at 26.  Access to selective colleges is highly skewed by race and ethnicity, and even more skewed by socio-
economic status. Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Selective 
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Given the growing inequality in America, the low voter turnout among the poor and 
uneducated, the lack of access of middle and lower income Americans to politicians, and the 
resulting lack of influence on “representatives” it is not surprising that legislation in general, and 
tort reform in particular, would not tend to the needs and preferences of a majority of Americans. 
 
C. Disenfranchised citizens (Illegal Americans)134 
Since 1975, incarceration rates in the United States have quadrupled and over 5.3 million 
felons and ex felons are prohibited from voting.135 2.5% of the general population is denied the 
vote.136 The demographics for the prison population significantly overlap with those in society 
who have low voter turnout and low political participation in general. Richard Freeman of 
Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic Research reports that the prison 
population is disproportionately black and young with low education and literacy levels.137 
College Admissions 10-11, 69, Table 1.1 (Century Foundation, Paper, March 2003), available at 
http://www.tcf.org/Publications/Education/carnevale_rose.pdf .  Carnevale and Rose found that “74 percent of the 
students at the top 146 highly selective colleges came from families in the top quarter of the SES scale (as measured 
by combining family income and the education and occupations of the parents), just 3 percent came from the bottom 
SES quartile, and roughly 10 percent came from the bottom half of the SES scale. If attendance at these institutions 
reflected the population at large, 85,000 students (rather than 17,000) would have been from the bottom two SES 
quartiles.” Id. 11. 
134 I use the term “illegal American” because it tracks the pejorative term “illegal immigrant.” It is a way marking 
them as “illegal” rather than as, say, hard working exploited immigrants.  We do not usually label people as “illegal” 
when they break the law and do not usually talk about the “illegal employer” problem in America. Felony 
disenfranchisement, particular post-release, is a way of marking people as outlaws or second class citizens.  
135 Manza and Uggen put the number at 5.3 million with 39% having completed their sentences. JEFF MANZA &
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 77 (2006).  See 
also KATHERINE I PETTUS, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS, INSTITUTIONAL 
RACISM, AND MODERN CONSEQUENCES (2005). As of June 2005, there were 4.8 people incarcerated out of every 
1,000, that is almost one out of very 200 people. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison 
Statistics (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm.  The percentages for Black males at the end of 2004 
was over 3% compared to white males at less than .05% of their population. Id. 
136 LALEH ISPAHANI, ACLU, OUT OF STEP WITH THE WORLD: AN ANALYSIS OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN 
THE U.S. AND OTHER DEMOCRACIES 3 (May 2006), http://www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_file825_25663.pdf. 
137Richard Freeman, Can We Close the Revolving Door? Recidivism vs. Employment of Ex-Offenders in the U.S.4
(The Urban Inst. Reentry Roundtable Discussion Paper No. 2 2003), available at 
http://www.ssw.umich.edu/events/CASD/freeman.pdf. 
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Information on released prisoners indicates that 14% have less than 8 years of schooling and 
67% have less than high school.138 Nearly half of the prison population consists of black males 
and 68% of all prisoners are below the age of 34.139 
Ex offenders do not do well in the job market. They have low employment rates and they 
tend to earn less than others with similar demographics140 Further, nearly one third have a 
physical impairment or mental condition and  21% have some physical or mental condition that 
impairs work ability.141 As Freeman states, “Since persons with physical and mental health 
problems, limited education, and poor literacy do badly in the US job market independently of a 
criminal record, [it should come as no surprise that] ex-offenders fare poorly in the job 
market.”142 It should also come as little surprise that under these conditions, most prisoners end 
up back in prison.143 
The felon/ ex-felon, is a distinct, insular and growing minority in our society. Although 
they represent an extreme case, their disenfranchisement is compounded by the fact that they 
have very little mobility, very little stake, and even less say in the future of our society.144 
138 Id. at 7, Table 3. 
139 Id. at 15, Table 1. 
140 Id. at 9-10 (referring to Richard Freeman, Economics of Crime, in THE HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS Vol 
3C (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (Chapter 52)); Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on 
Wage Mobility and Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. REV. (2002). 
141 Id. at 10, 11, Table 5. 
142 Id. at 13. 
143 Id. at 2 (citing PATRICK LANGAN & DAVID LEVIN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 1  (June 2002), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf).  
144 This is also true of the over 10 million unauthorized immigrant living in the U.S. For the numbers see JEFFREY S. 
PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS 1 (2005), 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf.  Unauthorized immigrants provide a cheep, hard working and docile 
labor force. Their presence keeps authorized immigrants and U.S. citizens relatively docile while keeping their 
wages low. They also provide a scapegoat for our woes and threats to our security, even though they put much more 
into our economy than they take out (including social security and taxes) and there have been few if any terrorists 
threats coming from unauthorized immigrants, especially from Mexico. The nineteen 9/11 terrorists entered the 
country legally. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 27 (2004).   
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Looking at the phenomenon comparatively, we incarcerate between 5 and 8 times the 
number of people incarcerated in other advanced industrial nations.145 The overwhelming 
majority of Western European states have no ban on voting at all,146 or only ban voting for 
specific criminals who commit certain serious crimes, and usually as explicit additional aspects 
of their prison sentence.147 While some twelve European states completely ban voting for 
incarcerated prisoners,148 ten of these twelve states are former Eastern Bloc countries who have a 
history of limited enfranchisement.149 Of the two Western European countries, Spain and the 
United Kingdom, Spain rarely disenfranchises its prisoners,150 and the practice of blanket bans in 
the United Kingdom has recently been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Hirst v. United Kingdom (No 2).151 Further, while some countries disqualify ex-felons from 
voting, “the sanction is purposefully and narrowly targeted, and the number of disenfranchised 
people is probably in the dozens or hundreds. In the United States, the disqualification is 
automatic, pursues no defined purpose and affects millions.”152 
Not only has the European Court of Human Rights condemned practices like that in the 
U.S., but so has the Supreme Court of Israel,153 the Supreme Court of Canada,154 and the 
 
145 ISPAHANI, supra note 136, at 6. 
146 Seventeen European states do not ban voting at all, nine of which are Western European states.  Id. 
147 Id. at 7. Eleven states fall in this category, with eight of them coming from Western Europe (Greece is counted in 
this tradition).  
148 Id. at 8.  
149 Id. at 8. 
150 Id. 
151 Hirst v. United Kingdom (No 2), 681 Eur Ct. H.R. (2005) (discussing a U.K. law denying the vote to all 
prisoners, stating “Such a general, automatic, and indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important Convention right 
must be seen as falling outside any acceptable margin of appreciation, however wide the margin might be, and is 
incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.”); ISPAHANI, supra note 156, at 8. 
152 ISPAHANI, supra note 155, at 6. 
153 Hilla Alrai v Minister of Interior HC2757/06 P.D. 50(2) 18 (1996) (refusing to disenfranchise Yigal Amir, the 
individual convicted of assassinating Yitzak Rabin, the Israeli Prime Minister.  “[W]ithout the right to elect, the 
foundation of all other rights is undermined… Accordingly every society should take great care not to interfere with 
the right to elect except in extreme circumstances.”). 
154 Sauvé v. Canada [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (striking down a law which denied the right to vote to those serving more 
than two years “Denying the vote denies the basis of democratic legitimacy.. if we accept that governmental power  
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Constitutional Court of South Africa.155 These countries recognize that denying prisoners the 
right to vote is not undesirable merely because it harms the individual who loses the right, but 
because it harms the democratic legitimacy of the state. As McLachlin CJ, writing for the 
majority in Sauvé v. Canada said: 
 
The right of all citizens to vote, regardless of virtue or mental ability or other 
distinguishing features, underpins the legitimacy of Canadian democracy and 
Parliament’s claim to power. A government that restricts the franchise to a select 
portion of citizens is a government that weakens its ability to function as the 
legitimate representative of the excluded citizens, jeopardises its claims to 
representative democracy, and erodes the basis of its right to convict and punish 
lawbreakers.156 
Denying prisoners the right to vote, particularly after they have served their time makes it 
clear that some people simply do not count, and are not a part of the same “democratic” America 
that the rest of us are. This is particularly troubling given that this class is greatly 
overrepresented by minorities, those who are economically disadvantaged, educationally 
deprived and who have mental and physical disabilities.  Taking away this right sends the 
message that these people are second class citizens, in effect, “illegal Americans.”  
 
in a democracy flows from the citizens, it is difficult to see how that power can legitimately be used to 
disenfranchise the very citizens from whom the government’s power flows.” Id. at para 32).  
155 National Institute of Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration of Offenders (NICRO), Erasmus and Schwagerl v. 
Minister of Home Affairs (CCT 03/04 2004) (striking down the Electoral Laws Amended Act 34 of 2003, which 
denied the right to vote for those serving prison sentences that did not have the option of a fine); August and 
Another v Electoral Commission and Others (CCT 8/99 1999) (holding that the Electoral Commission, by not 
providing the means and mechanisms for prisoners to vote, had breached the prisoner’s rights to vote under the 
Constitution). 
156 Sauvé v. Canada [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, para 34. 
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V. TORT “REFORM”
Jay Feinman links the current wave of tort “reform” to a systematic campaign to unmake 
the common law.157 Feinman traces the campaign to Ronald Regan’s inaugural address, where he 
stated that “Government is not the solution to our problems; government is the problem.”158 
Although this might not sound like an agenda to un-make the common law, the undoing of 
some100 years of common law developments is an integral part of this rather comprehensive 
view of the role of government in democracy. The idea is a return to a time of minimal 
governmental interference with the market (laissez faire capitalism) and with it pre-modern or 
classical legal thought under which judges are mere neutral referees, rather than guardians of 
justice. Here, individual negative rights embodying such notions as ‘freedom of contract’ and 
‘buyer beware’ trump public policy embodying ideas such as corporate responsibility and 
consumer safety, or taking measures to ensure that people actually are free.  
 Feinman makes three main points concerning the “Right’s” attack on the common law. 
“First, the law has dramatically changed to the detriment of ordinary people.”159 Second, the 
various individual developments in contract, property and tort law are part of a comprehensive, 
coordinated campaign,160 “by an army of corporations, foundations, lobbyists, litigation centers, 
 
157 FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 1. Feinman credits Stephan D. Sugarman, in Judges as Tort Law Un—Makers: Recent 
California Experience with ‘New’ Torts 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455 (1999) for the label. . For a comprehensive 
database on state tort reform totaling over 1,000 pages see Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms, 
(May 16, 2006) (Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 902711), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=902711. 
158 FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 172 (citing JOHN B. JUDIS & TUY TEIXEIRA, THE EMERGING DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY 
151-52 (2002).   
159 FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 3.  
160 Id. According to Feinman, Federalist Society members boasted that they occupied all of the assistant attorneys 
general positions and more than half of all other political appointments within the Regan-Meese Justice Department. 
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think tanks politicians and academics.”161 And third, the campaign is not conservative but is 
radical in its rejection of developments in the law over the last one hundred years.162 Feinman 
describes a campaign that is designed to take us back to the thoroughly discredited “classical 
theory” of the laissez faire Lochner era.163 
Feinman, like others, makes the point that the tort reform campaign is based on 
misinformation, if not lies.164 As Feinman states, “The problem with the conservative campaign, 
however, is that it is false. Not debatable, or a matter of opinion or political viewpoint, but 
false.”165 Its falsity is based in many little lies that exaggerate cases, overstate the amount of and 
the effect of frivolous lawsuits, the impact of regulations on property rights and as well as the 
impact of liberal adjudication on the sanctity of contract.166 When combined they feed into the 
big lie that the common law has been hijacked by greedy plaintiffs and lawyers as well as by 
liberal activist judges.167 
Although tort reform is not the only area of law that is bound up with our democratic 
deficit, as Feinman notes, “The longest-running front in the … campaign to reshape the common 
law has played out in …what lawyers call “tort law.””168 Given the data and arguments put forth 
above in parts II-IV, one does not need to be a conspiracy theorist to predict that a well 
 
Further, one fourth of all federal judicial candidates for under the second Bush administration were recommended by 
the Federalist society and most of the lawyer’s in the White House Counsel’s office have been active members. Id at 
189. 
161 FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 189. 
162 Id. at 3-4. It is in fact radical and undemocratic. 
163 Id. at 3-5, 7-18. Compare with Law, supra note 31-32 (making similar comments regarding the Rehnquist Court). 
164 See Lind, supra note 33, at 719; Abel, supra note 33, at 556; Goldberg, supra note 33; Priest, supra note 33, at 
683; Eaton, supra note 33; Witt, supra note 33, 
165 FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 190. 
166 Id. at 191. 
167 Id. at 191.
168 Id. at 19.  Feinman identifies the campaign as the “Right’s” campaign in the ellipse. The tort reform part of this 
campaign came together in the Tort Policy Working Group within the Reagan-Meese justice department. Id. at 186 
(citing the TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT 
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986)).  See 
also Dawn Johnson, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on 
Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L. J. 363 (2003). 
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organized and funded campaign to institute reform for the ‘haves’ by the ‘haves’ in the area of 
tort law would be successful even if it was not good for most Americans. The pervasive 
disinformation that accompanied this movement has no doubt acted like grease on a pig for those 
fighting against these “reforms” while acting like grease on the cogs of the machine for those 
pushing the reforms.  
I will first briefly canvass both the main achievements in democratic tort reform as well 
as the recent retrenchment of some of those achievements along with other regressive changes in 
tort law.  I will then look at the role of the Supreme Court in tort reform to show the 
unprecedented extent to which that institution has engaged in an area generally considered the 
domain of the states, their courts and Congress, to the detriment of the people and of democracy.  
Before doing so, it might be good to respond to a preliminary challenge. One may argue 
that since the bulk of progressive tort reform during the 60s and 70s was judicially created and 
most of the tort reform since the 1980s is legislative, the latter trend of regressive tort reform 
must have a better democratic pedigree than the former. This is dubious for at least two reasons. 
First, it is by no means settled that the bulk of progressive tort reform in the former period was 
judicial (see part V.A. below). More importantly, given the evidence above that our traditional 
“democratic” institutions (the executive and legislative branches) are skewed, or corrupted from 
the perspective of democratic values, then it follows that courts, which are generally insulated 
from interest group power politics and which are required to justify their decisions to the public 
through written decisions, may have a better chance of delivering decisions that are 
democratically justifiable. This is particularly true in the area of personal injury tort law where 
by and large the plaintiff class is unorganized and under funded, and the defendant class is well 
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organized and well funded.169 Potential victims have neither the motive nor the easy means for 
organizing. Most people do not think of themselves as potential plaintiffs and thus are not 
generally mobilized to press their concerns, while most businesses and their associations do 
factor in the potential of being a defendant and thus, they have both the motive and the means to 
press their interests in tort reform through experts, lobbying, and campaign contributions.170 
Abel also notes that the plaintiff’s bar does not necessarily have the interests of plaintiff’s in 
mind in its battle with the defense bar over tort reform, for instance when it comes to no-fault 
automobile compensation schemes. 171 
One way around the lack of influence in the judicial sphere is by contracting out of court 
and into arbitration where businesses, particularly businesses that are repeat players have a 
distinct advantage.172 The other tactic is try to break down the barriers that insulate courts as 
much as possible, and this takes place in part through concerted efforts to get pro-tort reform 
judges elected and appointed. For instance, the movement to dismantle strict liability in products 
cases in California came after 1986 when three liberal judges were voted off the bench and 
replaced with conservatives.173 Of course, the politicization of the judiciary took off under 
former President Reagan.174 As David Law notes “commentators have singled out Reagan for 
taking the politicization of the judiciary to new heights by implementing a centralized high-level 
 
169 Of course this is not true of business to business torts, but business to business torts is largely unaffected by tort 
reform.  Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 1, at 1080-85.   
170 See Abel, supra note 33, at 536-37. 
171 Id. at 537.    
172 See part V B.4 infra for the Supreme Court’s support of this move; See also Bryant G. Garthy, Tilting the Justice 
System from ADR as Idealistic Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927 
(2002).. 
173 Stephan D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California Experience with ‘New’ Torts, 49 
DEPAUL L. REV. 455 (1999). 
174 Note the early department of justice reports under Reagan, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION iii (1988),  
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/acs/conference/meese-memos/year2000.pdf (focusing on 15 key areas of constitutional 
controversy likely to go before the Court between 1988 and 2000, “the resolution of which is likely to be sharply 
influenced by the judicial philosophies of the individual justices who sit on the Court”). 
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process for the ideological vetting of judicial candidates.”175 According to Goldman, Reagan was 
very successful in appointing circuit court justices that remained faithful to his conservative 
agenda.176 This has been reinforced ever since by the active participation of conservative groups 
in the process of judicial nominations.177 
A. Tort Reform in General 
 
1. Progressive democratic tort reform 
 
Democracy reinforcing reform of tort law began in the early 1900s when workmen’s 
compensation schemes started to spread. The schemes were the clearest and earliest examples of 
trying to find collective justice for a group of people who were severely disadvantaged by the 
extant rules of the tort system.178 Other than workmen’s compensation and Cordozo’s opinion in 
 
175 David Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, The Senate and the Prisoner’s Dilema 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 479, 485-6 (2005) (referring to Elliot E. Slotnick, Federal Judicial Selection in the New Milllenium, Prologue, 
36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 587, 589-90 (2003)); and Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection As War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 667, 678 (2003) (remarking upon Reagan's reputation for attending to the ideology of his judicial nominees). 
176 SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 
116, 307 (1997). 
177 FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 189.  See also Nina Totenberg, Conservative Groups Push for More Judicial 
Confirmations (National Public Radio, Morning Edition radio broadcast, June 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5517409 (Conservative groups are urging President Bush and 
Senate Republicans to push harder to get more of the president's judicial nominees approved.  Social conservatives 
want more confirmations before the November elections in case the GOP loses Senate seats.). 
178 The extant rules included such defenses as the fellow servant exception to master servant liability, voluntary 
assumption of risk, and contributory negligence. See ARTHUR LARSON, 1-2 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
LAW §§ 2.03, 2.07-2.08 (2005), http://www.lexis.com.  Some courts did temper these defenses in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s allowing more workers to gain compensation, however the bulk of workers injured on the job were left 
without compensation or with very little compensation.  Id. at § 2.04, 2.07. See also part V. infra. See LARSON,
supra note 177, at §4, 7.  These were also years of progress for the women’s suffrage movement.  Note that 
women’s rights to tort compensation was also limited from the 1800s to the modern period. See Rustad & Koenig, 
supra note 17, at 34-35.  See also Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law Courts: 1860- 1930, 21 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 79 (1998). 
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MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., not much reform took place until the “Democratic 
Expansionary Era" after the Second World War.179 
This period saw the court moving from a view of the tort system as case by case 
corrective justice to a view of the system as a mechanism for collective justice, or providing 
justice across classes of cases.180 This is partially what allowed the courts to think not only of 
putting people back into the place they were before the tort, but of other social goals like 
deterring wrongs and providing incentives for manufacturers to make their products safer for 
society.181 Courts stopped merely accepting that the status quo distributions of power and wealth 
were just and tailored corrective justice to collective and distributive justice concerns.  
Democratic developments during the era resulted in the removal of immunity at both the 
federal level and the state level.182 It began with the Federal Tort Claims Act 1946 28 U.S. § 
2875 and most states followed with similar legislation, opening up their court for suits, thus 
making the state and the people equal before the law.183 The 1960s saw the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act which provided statutory tort actions for discrimination in employment, housing, 
educational, or public accommodations on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religion.184 
179 Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., 11 N.E. 1050, 1051-55 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that Buick owed a duty of care to 
the ultimate purchaser despite the absence of privity); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 17, at 38 
180 FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 53 (Feinman puts the starting date at 1920). The previous era (the late 1800s to early 
1900s) is often recognized as an era where the compensatory function of tort law was actually constricted. EDWARD 
WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 61 (1980). 
181 There of course is the challenge that this should be left to legislators to decide.  Cf. Abel, supra note 33.  
182 Sovereign immunity from suit was abandoned in France by 1905.  The first case to undermine the doctrine 
occurred in 1873 with the Tribunal des Conflicts cases of l’arrêt Blanco TC 8 Feb 1873, D.1873.17 (according 
jurisdiction to the administrative courts for actions brought against the state for damages caused by actions of 
persons employed in the public service) and the doctrine was solidified by 1905 in the case of Tomaso Grecco, CE 
10 Feb 1905, D.1906.3.81. See DUNCAN FAIRGRAVE, STATE LIABILITY IN TORT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 12-13 
(2001). 
183 See FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 56-57; DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §268 (2001).  England also followed suit 
in 1947 with the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947, although vestiges of immunity still exist.  FAIRGRAVE, supra note 
182, at 12, 14-16. 
184 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2001) (Equal Employment Opportunities). 
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Developments came in the area of consumer protection and products liability,185 which were 
crystallized in the Restatement Second of Torts in 1965.186 Comparative fault did not begin to 
overtake the draconian rule/ defense of contributory negligence (which in many cases completely 
barred a plaintiff from bringing a claim if she was at all negligent) until the 1970s.187 The general 
no duty rule in torts (the rule that we are not responsible for others and have no positive duties 
towards them) was also narrowed during the 1970s when courts started imposing duties on 
people in “special relations” with others (e.g. psychiatrists and patients, common carriers and 
passengers, schools and their pupils, landlords and tenant, and business and their customers).188 
These reforms helped consolidate democracy by providing enforcement mechanisms for hard 
won democratic rights as well as by  making it easier for those whose rights had been violated to 
access the justice system and vindicate those rights.   
2. Regressive tort reform 
 
As noted above, Feinman identified the Tort Policy Working Group from the Ronald 
Reagan-Edwin Meese justice department, as one of the main catalysts of the tort reform 
movement.189 That group identified a number of causes of the “liability insurance crisis,”190 and 
a set of recommendations or strategies for attacking that “crisis.” They summarily excluded all 
other explanations besides the civil justice system and thus unsurprisingly their 
recommendations or strategies focused only on attacking that system, by:  
 
185 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962). See also FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 55-56.  
Rustad and Koenig note a whole range of progressive decisions by the California courts during this era.  Rustad & 
Koenig, supra note, 17 at 45-49. 
186 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).  
187 Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 1, at 1069-70.  
188 Id. at 1065-69. 
189 FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 25.    
190 The decline of fault as the basis for liability, the undermining of causation, the explosive growth in damage 
awards, and the high transaction costs of the system. Id. at 26. 
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1) making it harder for injury victims to get into court, 
2) making it more difficult to win once they are there, and  
3) restricting damage recoveries for plaintiffs who do win.191 
This, in perhaps oversimplified terms, has guided the tort reform movement ever since.192 
a. Keeping plaintiffs out of court. 
 
How do you keep plaintiffs out of court? You make it less attractive for lawyers to take 
the cases, by putting limits on contingency fees, 193 or through “early offer” mechanisms (which 
include attorney fee limits) for economic damages which would preclude or make it very 
difficult to receive non-economic damages like pain and suffering.194 Or you can make it 
difficult for states to hire attorneys for complex litigation (e.g. tobacco and gun cases).195 And 
finally, you can make it harder for people to join together in class actions.196 This has been done 
in part through the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 which takes many class actions out of the 
state courts and puts them into the federal courts.197 The "federalization" of class actions may act 
 
191 Id. at 25, 27. 
192 Id. Note, the structure of this overview follows the structure of FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 27-46, but is not 
limited to its substance. 
193 Id. at 27-28. 
194 Id. at 29-30. 
195 Id. at 30-31. 
196 Id. at 31-32.  
197 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1335(a)(1), 1453, 1603(b)(3), 
1711-15).  The literature on the act is already quite extensive. See e.g., Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herrmann, 
Symposium: Class Actions in the Gulf South and Beyond, The Class Action Fairness Act: An Ill-Conceived 
Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1695 (2006); see id. at 1996, footnote 1 for an extensive list of 
academic commentary on the Act (forty plus pieces).  As Klonoff and Herrmann state, “It is well known that under 
CAFA, most major class actions, including virtually all multistate class actions, will now be heard in federal court.” 
Id. at 1696. 
41
to deny or impede plaintiff's access to justice for in a number of reasons,198 including the relative 
difficulty of certifying classes in federal courts,199  and the fact that the federal courts are 
overcrowded and appeals may cause undue delay.200 Further, to the extent that Republicans have 
managed to take over the federal judiciary and/or to secure anti-litigation justices on the federal 
bench, one would expect more bias against plaintiffs in general and against class actions in 
particular.201 As we will see below, access to courts can also be limited through the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements that often preclude class actions,202 and that, by definition, limit access 
to the courts, both in the first instance and as a matter of review.  
 
b. Making it harder for plaintiff to win cases 
 
The other more direct route is to change the liability rules to make it harder for plaintiffs 
to win when they get to court.  This has happened in the case of making strict liability less strict 
in products liability cases,203 setting up procedural obstacles in medical malpractice cases,204 and 
 
198 Allan Kanner, Interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act in a Truly Fair Manner, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1654 
(2006). 
199 The federal courts' reluctance to issue class certification is well documented (referring to S. Rep. No. 106-420, at 
57-59 (2000) (noting minority senators' views on CAFA)) (noting also that a review of forty-three class action cases 
involving life insurance marketing practices found that cases were nearly twice the certification in state court as in 
federal court) (referring to Public Citizen, Unfairness Incorporated: The Corporate Campaign Against Consumer 
Class Actions 85 (June 2003), http:// www.citizen.org/documents/ACF2B13.pdf). 
200 Kanner, supra note 198, at 1654.  For the view that class actions are undemocratic because they have led to 
substantive changes in the law, which did not go through the legislative process, see Martin H. Redish, Class 
Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 71 (2003). 
201 For an account of the Republican efforts to appoint conservatives to the bench since Reagan see, e.g., Law, supra 
note 27, at 485-86 (noting that Reagan succeeded in making ideological considerations paramount: by one observer's 
count, over three-quarters of his circuit court appointees furthered his conservative agenda, with the balance 
appearing to reward the party faithful.  Id. at 490. 
202 See part V.B.4 infra.
203 See FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 34-40.  See part V infra. In fact the move is to return certain forms of products 
liability to a negligence standard.  
204 See, e.g., Thomas Baker who, commenting on the effect of the Harvard Medical Malpractice Study (HMPS), 
notes that “policymakers have seized on the weakest aspect of the HMPS, the analysis of the validity of medical 
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by providing immunity from suit for certain industries.205 This has been the case with gun 
manufacturers206 as well as biomaterials manufacturers.207 
c. Capping damages and making punitive damages harder to get. 
 
Finally, one of the most active areas of tort reform has centered around limiting damages, 
and this has happened by placing limits on joint and several liability,208 limiting the collateral 
source rule,209 and non-economic damage caps,210 including not only limits on punitive 
damages,211 but also limits on pain and suffering damages. 212 In addition to placing caps on 
 
malpractice claims, and used that analysis to justify imposing caps on damages in medical malpractice cases and 
additional procedural hurdles for medical malpractice claimants. For that reason the practical impact of the HMPS 
may well have been to expand the gap between the large number of people who are injured by medical malpractice 
and the few people who are compensated and to increase the likelihood that the compensation that is received will 
be inadequate.” Thomas Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Malpractice Study: Conclusions About the 
Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 501, 511 (2005). 
205 This also echoes the reinvigorated state immunity doctrine of the Supreme Court. See V.B.5 infra.
206FEINMAN, supra note 8 at 33; Daniel Feldman, Legislating or Litigating Public Policy Change: Gunmaker Tort 
Liability 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 140 (2004); But see the repeal of immunity in California, John Fowler, Will a 
Repeal of Gun Manufacturer Immunity from Civil Suits Untie the Hands of the Judiciary? 34 MCGEORGE L. REV.
339 (2003).  
207 FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 33 - 34.  See also James D. Kerouac, Note, A Critical Analysis of the Biomaterials 
Access Assurance Act of 1998 as Federal Tort Reform Policy, B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 327 (2001). 
208 See, e.g., the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies’ report on Joint and Several Liability Rule 
Reform.  NAT’L ASS’N OF MUT. INS. COS., JOINT AND SEVERAL LIAB. REFORM STATES,
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/JointAndSeveralLiability.asp (last visited July 27, 2006).   
209 See NAT’L ASS’N OF MUT. INS. COS., COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE REFORM,
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/CollateralSourceRule.asp (last visited July 27, 2006).  Note that according 
to Kevin S. Marshall and Patrick W. Fitzgerald, forty-four states have enacted legislation allowing for the 
consideration of the payment of collateral source benefits. Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick W. Fitzgerald, The 
Collateral Source Rule and Its Abolition: An Economic Perspective, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 61 (2005) ( See 
Appendix I) (arguing that  tort reform designed to undermine the collateral source rule is the product of defense 
oriented public interest group lobbying and has resulted in arbitrary wealth transferring legislation that not only 
undermines the legitimate purposes of tort law, namely, compensation, indemnity, restitution and deterrence, but is 
economically unsound).  
210 See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF MUT. INS. COS., NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGE REFORM,
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/NoneconomicDamage.asp (last visited July 27, 2006).   
211 See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF MUT. INS. COS., PUNITIVE DAMAGE REFORM,
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/PunitiveDamage.asp (last visited July 27, 2006). 
212 See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 40-46. Medical malpractice reform is one very significant area of regressive 
reform. Nockleby & Curreri believe that reform efforts in this area can be traced to the abandonment of the locality 
rule of practice which undermined the "conspiracy of silence" by holding doctors to a national standard of care.  
Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 1, at 1023, Part III.B.2. 
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punitive damages, tort reform has also included increasing the burden of proof on the plaintiff in 
order to receive punitive damages.213 As Michael L. Rustad explains,   
 
Forty-five out of the fifty-one jurisdictions either do not recognize punitive 
damages or have enacted one or more restrictions on the remedy since 1979. 
These reforms include capping punitive damages, bifurcating the amount of 
punitive damages from the rest of the trial, raising the burden of proof, allocating 
a share of punitive damages to the state, and restricting use of evidence of 
corporate wealth. The handful of jurisdictions that have yet to enact tort reforms 
are mostly punitive damages cold spots rather than tort hellholes.214 
All of these mechanisms undermine achievements from the 60s and 70s which made it 
easier for relatively week and unorganized victims to organize and to access justice to vindicate 
their rights.  They undermine the deterrent effects of tort law designed to keep consumers safe 
and hold those who profit from placing dangerous products into the stream of commerce 
responsible for those products. These changes benefit the few at the expense of the majority of 
Americans. 
d. Illegal Americans revisited 
 
213 See, e.g,. JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE§ 4:60 CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE STANDARD (3rd ed) (WL database updated April 2006);  See also 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 706 VI. 
Practice and Procedure B. Evidence 1. Burden; Sufficiency of Proof, Punitive or exemplary and multiple damages 
(WL database updated May 2006) (requiring clear and convincing evidence and in some jurisdictions, proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt). 
214 Rustad, supra note 35, at 1300. 
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It may come as little surprise that there has been regressive tort reform at the federal level 
in the area of prison litigation that achieves all three goals, i.e. making it harder for prisoners to 
get into court, making it more difficult to win once they are there, and restricting damage 
recoveries for them when they do win.215 As James Robertson notes,  
 
The [Prison Litigation Reform Act] constrains inmates by requiring them to 
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit; pay filing fees; and forgo 
damages for emotional injuries absent a prior physical injury.  While the Act 
permits the judiciary to sua sponte dismiss claims failing to state a cause of 
action, its power to grant prospective relief cannot extend beyond correcting the 
right in question; and the relief can be terminated within two years or, in some 
instances, sooner. In addition, the Act caps fees for attorneys and special 
masters.216 
These reforms severely limit victims rights to access to justice and compensation for the 
violation of their rights. The extent of the limits placed on prisoners, the most vulnerable and 
politically disempowered minority population in our country is particularly troubling. It, is the 
most drastic demonstration of the symbiotic relationship between the loss of political equality 
and the further erosion of rights through regressive tort reform. 
 
B. The Role of the Supreme Court in Regressive Tort “Reform” 
 
215 Prison Litigation Reform Act Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). 
216 James Robertson, The Jurisprudence of the PLRA: Inmates as "Outsiders" and the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 188-189 (2002) (Fall 2001/Winter 2002). President William Clinton 
signed this bill into law. 
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For the greater part of the history and evolution of American tort law, the U.S. the 
Supreme Court has not been a central actor. Few, if any, of the major advances in tort law during 
the 60s and 70s are credited to that institution.217 This is because, tort law is traditionally either a 
part of state common law or state and federal statutory law. Heavy involvement by the Supreme 
Court in either of these areas raises the possibility of activism, either in the form of the court 
overstepping boundaries based on federalism concerns or overstepping boundaries based on 
separation of powers concerns. Of course, it may be contended that either the states or Congress 
has overstepped rather than the Supreme Court.  
In either event, significant legal change in the area of civil litigation and torts at the 
Supreme Court level signals that something more significant is a-foot than the normal ebb and 
flow of state based tort reform initiatives.  While the wave of tort reform beginning in the 80s is 
not generally credited to the Supreme Court,218 the Court has played a very strong supporting 
role in that movement, both in its rhetoric,219 and in its decisions during the last two decades. The 
court has had a significant impact on the broader category of civil litigation, and this impact is 
commensurate with regressive tort reform in general. The Supreme Court, has, in effect put its 
imprimatur on the movement. 
Andrew Siegel in a careful and thorough piece, paints a picture of the Rehnquist Court as 
a Court with an overarching hostility to litigation.220 As Seigel states, “In case after case and in 
 
217 See, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 17, at 105, Appendix One: American Tort Law Timeline: 1200-2002. The 
notable exception is in the area of the first amendment.   
218 Most of it has been carried out state by state through legislation and in their courts. See eg,. FEINMAN, supra note 
8, at 44.  
219 Note the many jibes in the cases limiting the ability of plaintiffs to seek relief in the courts . Siegel, supra note 
26, at 1124, footnote 102 (mainly coming from Scalia). Note also the rhetoric in the punitive damages cases of 
damages “running wild.” Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) [Hereinafter Haslip].   
220 Siegel, supra note 26, at 1097.  Although Siegel is not the first to identify this attitude, he is the first to draw it 
out as an overarching theme of the court.  For earlier, more partial references to the idea, See Vicki C. Jackson, 
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wildly divergent areas of the law, the Rehnquist Court has expressed a profound hostility to 
litigation.”221 Seigel’s point is not to dismiss the voluminous existing explanatory narratives of 
the court such as, federalism, conservatism, or even judicial supremacy, but to show that they 
are incomplete and misleading without an understanding of the Court’s hostility to litigation.222 
This hostility is not an even handed hostility to all litigants alike. It manifests itself most 
prominently to the disadvantage of plaintiff’s, and common people, and to the advantage of 
defendants and legal fictions, namely states and other corporate entities. 223 
Siegel finds it curious that this hostility coexists with “the Court’s concurrent 
commitment to an aggressive form of judicial supremacy”224 and he explores a range of 
explanatory vectors, not least of which is the strong correlation between a conservative social 
vision and the cases in which the Court has shown the most hostility to litigation as well as when 
it seems to most zealously promote its supremacy.225 Other explanatory vectors include an 
oversimplified view of separation of powers,226 and the structure and sociology of the American 
legal profession within which there is a tendency for the best trained and best connected lawyers 
(including the members of the Court and their associates) to congregate in civil defense and 
constitutional litigation rather than in personal injury.227 
Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L. J. 
691, 706-19 (2000) (identifying  "hostility to litigation" as one of the themes behind the court’s 1999 sovereign 
immunity decisions). 
221 Siegel, supra note 26, at 1117.  While I track Siegel’s treatment of the Court’s hostility to litigation the treatment 
below focuses on how that hostility translates into undermining democratic values. 
222 Id. at 1102.  
223 As Siegel notes, “Any survey of the Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation, however cursory, must begin with 
the obvious: In myriad ways, the Court has made life very difficult for civil plaintiffs.” Id. at 1117. Siegel notes that 
while the court is generally hostile to litigation, it treats “plaintiffs litigation” as particularly “demeaning and 
disreputable.” Id. at 1201.  
224 Id. at 1098. 
225 Id. at 1199-1200.  
226 Id. at 1200-1201.  Although Siegel sees this as one possible explanatory vector, he notes that it is not an 
explanation that is consistent with a number of the court’s decisions. Id. at footnote 458 (referring to the discussion 
in the text accompanying footnotes 109-110. The implausibility of this explanation is further explored below). 
227 Id. at 1202. 
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The democracy based explanation, which is not directly pursued by Siegel, but which is 
consistent with both Supreme Court elitism and certain aspects of a conservative social vision, is 
that the Court lacks sufficient concern for democratic values. The point is not to simply trot out 
the old hobby horse of counter-majoritarianism (i.e. the court is an activist Court with little 
respect for other democratic institutions)228 but that many of the Court’s decisions undermine 
democratic accountability and fail to accord equal concern and respect for everyone who is 
affected by their decisions.  
Those cases which evidence the Court’s hostility to litigation most directly include cases 
involving the Court’s reluctance to provide remedies for those whose rights have been violated, 
official immunity and fee shifting statutes cases, punitive damages cases, cases that involve the 
Federal Arbitration Act and state sovereign immunity cases. 
 
1. Constricting remedies 
 
A number of authors have commented on the Court’s constriction of remedies for those 
whose rights have been violated.229 One of the most recent authors to address this issue is 
Andrew Seigel, who analyzes four paradigm case,230 out of many, 231 in which the Rehnquist 
 
228 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the 
Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002); Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY L. J. 
481, 495 (2002); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 130 (2001).  Note that 
courts are not categorically counter-majoritarian.  Given the evidence above concerning the “representative” 
branches and Richard Abel’s work, Abel, supra note 33, there is no reason to think that the courts are less likely to 
provide democratically justifiable decisions in the area of torts.  
229 See Goldberg, supra note 40 (arguing for a Constitutional Right to an adequate legal scheme for the redress of 
wrongs); Christopher J. Roederer, Another Case in Lochner’s Legacy, The Court’s Assault on New Property 54 
DRAKE L. REV. 321, 341-42, 342-351, 360 (2006); Andrew Siegel & Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's 
Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343 (2002); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, 
Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L. J. 223 (2003). 
230 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (no private right of action exists to enforce the disparate impact 
regulations barring entities who receive federal funds from adopting policies that have the "effect" of discriminating 
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Court has undermined the traditional view that rights imply remedies for their violation.232 He 
analyzes these cases in considerable detail noting that in every case there was an acknowledged 
or assumed injury to a defined legal interest and there was Supreme Court precedent supporting 
relief.233 
It is interesting to note that the Court at times attempts to justify these decisions on 
democratic grounds.234 Siegel phrases the court’s democratic justification in terms of ensuring 
that coercive sanctions are not imposed without careful communal deliberation.235 This line of 
argument is rooted in separation of powers concerns, namely concerns that the courts not 
encroach on the prerogatives of representative institutions to make the law and determine 
whether there should be remedies for the breach of law.236 In a number of these cases, the Court 
appears to engage in a dialogue with Congress and or the states, imploring them to speak more 
clearly if they wish to create private remedies.237 
However, it is difficult for this explanation of the Court’s decisions to hold up, given the 
Court’s assault on §1983 claims, for that assault is in direct conflict with the spirit, if not the 
 
on the basis of race) Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (Bivens action (private remedy for 
Constitutional right violation not available for a federal prisoner held in a private correctional facility in a claim 
against the corporation for violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment."); 
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (a remedial provision of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) does not provide a right of recovery); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 
U.S. 273 (2002) (private individuals harmed by violations of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 
(FERPA) cannot seek redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).  
231 Siegel lists several cases but does not include Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (dismissing 
respondent’s case for failing to establish that she had a property right in the enforcement of a mandatory restraining, 
thereby failing to establish that she had a right that was worthy of procedural due process protection which would 
provide a right to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).  
232 Siegel, supra note 26, at 1118-1129. 
233 Id. at 1122.  
234 Id. at 1129.   
235 Id.
236 Siegel refers to Corr Servs. Corp. v. Malesko (534 U.S. 204, 67-69 (2002)) which discusses a number of cases 
limiting remedies to civil litigants on the grounds of separation of powers).  Siegel, supra note 26, at footnote 119. 
237 Siegel refers to Gonzaga University v. Does, (536 US 273, 280-81 (2002)) (describing the need for congress to 
speak clearly of its intention to create a private remedy) Siegel, supra note 26.  See also Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 
2806 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.5(a)–(b) (1999)). It is doubtful that the Court in Castle Rock was genuine. 
See, Roederer, supra note 229, at, 341-42, 342-351, 360. 
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letter of §1983 under which Congress explicitly provided for the right to a remedy for the 
violation of federal law, including constitutional law.238 This is not only evidenced by some of 
the cases mentioned above, including Gonzaga and Castle Rock, but also in cases where the 
court has expanded official immunity from damages under §1983 and its decisions which make it 
harder to recoup attorneys fees under §1983.239 
These decisions fly in the face of democratic concerns, not only by undermining 
“democratically” passed legislation but by undermining mechanisms designed to help 
consolidate and protect democratic rights.  
A similar pattern is found in the Court’s expansion of the doctrine of qualified immunity 
over the last twenty years which have resulted in more stringent standards for determining a 
clearly established right as well as greater tolerance for errors of judgments on the part of 
officials claiming the immunity.240 The result is that it is harder in these cases for victims who 
have had recognized rights violated to vindicate those rights.241 
238 Oddly, the Court uses arguments and policy drawn from implied right of actions cases (under which separation of 
powers concerns perhaps justifiably act to limit the court in creating rights of action) to limit §1983 claims. This is 
odd because §1983 was specifically enacted to provide rights of action and thus the Court is undermining the 
separation of powers when it denies such claims. See Siegel, supra note 26, at 1126 and Roederer, supra note 229, at 
321-69. 
239 See Siegel, supra note 26, at 1126, 1130.  
240 Id. at 1130-31, footnote 123 (also see the cases cited therein); see Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) 
(per curium)  But see the handful of cases where the Court has limited overly expansive interpretations/ applications 
of immunity by circuit courts e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (holding that the circuit court erred in 
applying a "rigid gloss" to the qualified immunity standard that denied relief to tort plaintiffs if there was no prior 
case with "materially similar" facts where a constitutional violation had been established); Johnson v. Jones, 515 
U.S. 304, 307 (1995) (unanimously holding, contrary to the position of a number of circuits, that an order denying 
summary judgment in a qualified immunity case because of uncertainty about the factual sufficiency of the 
allegations was not immediately appealable). 
241 Siegel, supra note 26, at 1131-32; see e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist 
Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 482-84 (2002); Jackson, supra note 220, at 691, 707 
(locating the Supreme Court's 1999 sovereign immunity decisions in the context of a variety of other anti-litigation 
initiatives of the Rehnquist Court and offering the Court's "hostility to litigation" as one of many overlapping themes 
motivating those decisions).  David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial 
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23 (1989) (arguing that the doctrine is 
based on right wing judicial activism). The push for the immunity of corporate entities is not confined to the state.  
FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 33-34. 
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2. Access to Fee Shifting 
 
Fee shifting legislation which allowed for those suing to vindicate their civil rights to 
claim attorneys fees when they prevailed in their cases constituted a very important and 
progressive development for civil litigants.242 This development accompanied the Civil Rights 
of 1964 and was later incorporated into the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Act of 1976. That 
reform helped to ensure that the rights won on paper, and which evidence the coming to age of 
our democracy, could actually be vindicated in practice. This reform not only made it easier for 
victims to obtain counsel, bring claims and receive remedies for the wrongs they suffered, but it 
had the further purpose and effect of keeping those hard won democratic gains on track. 
Plaintiff’s in these cases are not merely vindicating private wrongs but helping vindicate and 
deter public wrongs. 
Again, however, the Rehnquist Court has widled away at this mechanism for vindicating 
those rights which help keep our democracy on tract. It has done so by narrowing down the class 
of “prevailing plaintiffs” and it has done this by devaluing the importance of having the 
Constitution, and one’s rights under the Constitution, vindicated. In other words the devaluation 
of constitutional rights is not merely the result of this practice, but is in fact the means through 
which it is achieved. The Court has denied “prevailing party” status to plaintiff’s in cases where 
the decision that the plaintiff’s rights had been violated were not entered into a formal 
declaratory judgment or injunction, when although entered into judgment they did not provide a 
“substantial benefit” to the claimant, where the claimant only receives nominal damages, and/ or 
 
242 See eg., Siegel, supra note 26, at 1136.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243, tit. II & tit. 
VII.; see .eg., Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1622, 1623, 1636.; Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990,  Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328. 
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where the claimant whose suit compels the abandonment of an illegal practice or rule is not 
accompanied by a binding judicial decree.243 
These cases appear to deny the congressionally mandated relief on rather narrow and 
technical grounds which are not supported by the separation of powers, nor the democracy 
reinforcing purposes of the provisions themselves. The cases which narrowly read “prevailing 
party” to exclude those whose rights are vindicated but whose damages are nominal or 
insubstantial completely undervalues the federal and constitutional rights these provisions were 
designed to help safeguard. The fact that money damages are inadequate or inappropriate in 
some of these cases, or that specific performance is more appropriate does not mean that a 
vindication of the right is less important or valuable. It demeans the legislation and the rights it 
was designed to protect to act as if it was designed to only protect losses that could be, or are, 
converted into money damages. Further, to deny the shifting of fees in these cases does the most 
damage to the purpose of the legislation, which was to encourage these types of suits.244 This is 
because, it is exactly in those cases where there are few monetary damages that it will be most 
difficult for plaintiff’s to secure adequate legal representation. Without monetary damages or fee 
shifting the attorney’s fees must come from the plaintiff.  
3. Punitive Damages 
 
The Supreme Court has also weighed in on punitive damages, and while Siegel is correct 
to point out that punitive damages are something of a lightening rod for tort reform advocates, he 
is incorrect to think that this is in part due to the fact that they “represent a substantial share of 
 
243 See e.g., Siegel, supra note 26, at 1137.  See also Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 759-60 (1987); Rhodes v. 
Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1988) (per curiam); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992); Buckhannon Bd. & Care 
Home v. W. Va. Dept’s of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605(1994). 
244 see Kay v. Ehrler, 499 US 432, 436 (1991). 
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the costs of our current regime.”245 Punitive damages are in fact very rare246 and although awards 
may be extreme in some cases, the numbers are not significant in light of the vast majority of 
cases.247 
The Rehnquist Court, unlike any Court before has sought to limit the availability of 
punitive damages. The changes in this area have gone from requiring certain procedural 
safeguards to substantive limits on the amount of damages.248 Not unlike the fee shifting 
limitation, here the Court pegs its substantive limits to compensatory damages,249 thus making 
 
245 Siegel, supra note 26, at 1148.  See e.g., Rustad & Koegin, supra note 17 at 60-65.  Theodore Eisenberg et. al.,
Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 
1996, and 2001 Data . 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263 (2006) (Hereinafter Eisenberg Et. Al.—Legal Stud.), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=912309.  As Eisenberg has stated elsewhere, “Misperceptions about juries and 
punitive damages are especially strong. Contrary to popular belief, juries rarely award such damages, and award 
them especially rarely in products liability and medical malpractice cases. Rather, juries tend to award punitive 
damages in intentional misconduct cases. When juries do award punitive damages, they do so in ways that relate 
strongly to compensatory awards.” Theodore Eisenberg Et Al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical 
Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 745 (2002) (Hereinafter known as Eisenberg Et. Al.—Conrnell). 
246 Eisenberg found that judges award punitive damages in about 4% of decided cases and juries in about 5% of 
decided cases. Eisenberg Et. Al.—Legal Stud., supra note 245, at 268.  However, given that these numbers reflect 
cases in which plaintiffs win, they only represent about half of all cases tried, and since less than 5% of cases go to 
court, while the rest settle, and this makes the number of punitive damages cases quite deminimus (below 3 in 
10,000).  
247 Eisenberg’s study indicates that most cases involve awards of under $100,000 (60%); over 23% are under 
$10,000, and less than 11% are over 1 million. Id. at 270.  
248 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (striking down a damage award as 
excessive); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 426, 448 (2001) (holding that 
appellate courts should review trial court determinations as to the constitutionality of punitive damage awards de 
novo); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996) (striking down a damage award as excessive); 
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 418 (1994) (holding that the lax standard for appellate review of punitive 
damages mandated by the Oregon Constitution violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); 
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446, 465-66 (1993) (reviewing a punitive damage award for 
excessiveness but finding it within constitutional limits); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24 (reviewing both Alabama's 
method of assessing punitive damages and the magnitude of an award in a particular case but finding no 
constitutional problem); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60 (1989) (holding that 
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply to punitive damage awards and declining to set 
aside a punitive damage award as excessive); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 76-80 (1988) 
(discussing but declining to answer on prudential grounds major constitutional questions regarding punitive damage 
awards).  See Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages and State Sovereignty, 13 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 1 (2004). 
249 In State Farm, although the Court would not make a bright line ratio, it stated that “…in practice, few awards 
exceeding a single –digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due 
process.”  State Farm, 538 U.S. at 410.  However the Court did note that “ratios greater than those that this Court has 
previously upheld may comport with due process where a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small 
amount of economic damages.” Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 581-82). 
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cases that do not involve high levels of economic damages harder to bring.250 Again, like in the 
fee shifting cases, limiting punitive damages, particularly in this fashion, reduce the efficacy of 
punitive damages as a way of deterring the egregious behavior of defendants. Whereas above the 
Court was undermining the role that fee shifting played in securing federal and constitutional 
rights, here, limitations on punitive damages also limits the public policy role that punitive 
damages play in deterring some of the worst forms of corporate irresponsibility.251 
4. Arbitration Clauses (contracting out of defending claims in court, etc.) 
 
The Court has also gone out of its way to broadly construe the Federal Arbitration Act. 
As was noted above, contracting out of courts and into arbitration is one way of circumventing 
an institution that is unresponsive to special interest pressures.  There may be a tendency to think 
that arbitration, as a form of alternative dispute resolution, is thereby progressive.252 At the very 
least some might think that it is no less progressive than regular litigation and should be given 
equal footing. Seigel in fact acknowledges that the Court’s recognition of Arbitration may have 
began as an effort to put arbitration on an equal footing with litigation. However, as he notes, it 
has ended up as “a policy-driven assault on the wisdom and propriety of litigation as a 
 
250 Siegel, supra note 26, at 1147.  
251 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L. J. 347, 355 (2003); DAN B. 
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §381 (2000); FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 42- 46.  Siegel notes that the court is 
particularly hostile to litigation in cases like punitive damages where litigation is meant to achieve greater societal 
purposes.  Siegel, supra note 26, at 1160, footnote 255. 
252 As Garthy notes, “…mandatory arbitration, …gained support from idealistic academic studies… promoting 
"procedural justice." The idea was that arbitration allows individuals to tell their stories, and therefore litigants 
perceive the process as a more legitimate form of justice than the usual result of litigation-a negotiated settlement. 
Both mediation and arbitration contain a tradition-now seemingly muted-that the results are supposed to be better 
than strict enforcement of the law.”  Garthy, supra note 172. 
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mechanism for resolving such disputes.”253 There is little question that arbitration has its 
benefits, particularly in terms of costs to the parties. For equal bargaining partners arbitration 
may in fact be superior to litigation.   
The Court’s practice, however, has been to ignore the bargaining disparities of the parties 
(particularly of economically weaker plaintiffs). As Siegel states, “[i]t has consistently enforced 
form arbitration agreements that shift cases from courts to alternative forums without regard for 
the practical consequences to potential plaintiffs.”254 There are at least five significant effects of 
allowing companies to bind consumers (and smaller less powerful companies) to arbitration. 
First, the company gets to choose a venue that is more congenial to it. Second its gets a forum 
that has less due process than a court has,255 e.g. in terms of discovery, the right to a jury,256 and 
judicial review. Third it can oust the possibility of punitive damages. Fourth, it can eliminate the 
 
253 Siegel, supra note 26, at 1141. 
254 Siegel, supra note 26, at 1117-1118. The literature critiquing the court on this point is vast. See e.g., Paul D. 
Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 401 (1996) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court's arbitration jurisprudence will allow "birds of prey" to "sup on workers, consumers, shippers, 
passengers, and franchisees"); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and 
Consumer Right Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 33, 36 (1997) ("The Supreme 
Court has created a monster."); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's 
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process 
Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997) (critiquing arbitration case law for increasingly favoring arbitral forums without 
regard for basic fairness or rule of law norms); See also e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise 
of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945 (1996); Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with 
Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293 (1999); Paul H. Haagen, 
New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039 
(1998); David M. Kinnecome, Where Procedure Meets Substance: Are Arbitral Procedures a Method of Weakening 
the Substantive Protections Afforded by Employment Rights Statutes?, 79 B. U. L. REV. 745 (1999); Lewis L. 
Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29 (1998); Margo 
E. K. Reder, Arbitrating Securities Industry Employment Discrimination Claims: Restructuring a System to Ensure 
Fairness, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 19 (1999); Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has 
Pre-Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998); Jean R. Sternlight, 
Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 637 (1996); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WISC. L. REV. 831 (2001). 
255 “Just as important to anyone concerned with the morality of law is the fact that the arbitrator can decide a case 
without regard for the law or the facts in a case. There is no predictable outcome, no procedural protection.” 
Deborah W. Post, Dismantling Democracy: Common Sense and the Contract Jurisprudence of Frank Easterbrook,
16 TOURO L. REV 1205, 1236 (2000).  See also Garthy, supra note 172.   
256 This arguably undermines one of the main democratic components of our system of justice (both civil and 
criminal). 
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possibility of victims ioining together in class actions to bring suit.257 Finally, as Richard Posner 
states, parties are not entitled to awards that are “correct or even reasonable, since neither error 
nor clear error, nor even gross error is a ground for vacating an award.”258 All of these factors 
benefit the few at the expense of the majority. As Garthy suggests,  
 
It is not the simplistic bias of decision-making structured for the employers or 
companies to win. Instead, the bias is found in a system in which only a few 
constituencies are comfortable making their arguments and confident that their 
concerns will be understood, even if they lose some cases. The bias is also in a 
process that selects neutrals who will be safe for the leading lawyers and clients-
whoever controls the selection-and rejects those who appear too political, too 
unreliable, or too risky even on the basis of cultural stereotypes.259  
This is about as undemocratically tailored as a justice system can be. It is perfectly suited 
for employers and companies who are repeat players and everyone else, must simply take it, or 
go without.260 Deborah Post, in describing the 7th Circuit case of Hill v. Gateway 2000 Inc.,261 
257Eliminating class actions means that many consumers with small harms simply won’t pursue claims, thereby 
allowing business to defraud large numbers of consumers in small amounts.  FEINMAN, supra note 8, at 104. It is 
only through joining as a class that they can in any way approximate the power of big business Id. at 80; see also 
Post, supra note 255, at 1226.  In Gateway, Justice Easterbrooke upheld an “arbitration agreement” that was not 
negotiated, but simply shipped with the plaintiffs computer binding the plaintiff/consumer to its terms unless the 
consumer shipped the computer back to the manufacturer at its own cost within 30 days (a rolling shrink wrap).  Hill 
v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th. Cir. 1997) cert. denied 522 U.S. 808, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997); see also FEINMAN,
supra note 8, at 88. This is just one way of forming binding contracts with little to no notice, much less bargaining. 
In addition to the normal boilerplate adhesion contract, others include, shrink wraps, browse-wraps and click-wraps 
in which the agreement is packaged with the product, put on a website or on the computer screen to click.  FEINMAN,
supra note 8, at 86.  
258 IDS Life Insurance Company v. Royal alliance Associates, Inc, 266 F. 3d 645, 650-651 (7th Cir. 2001). 
259 Garthy, supra note 172, at 933. 
260 Just as we saw the Court abandoning its fidelity of separation of powers, the Court here abandons its fidelity to 
federalism when into comes into conflict with its desire to limit access to the courts through the FAA. Siegel, supra 
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states, “The Gateway case …threatens the democratic process on two levels. Not only does it 
create a model of contract formation that gives entire control over the terms of the agreement to 
one side, it also deprives the less powerful party, the individual consumer, of the only 
mechanism she has to directly confront behavior that is predatory, abusive or simply 
overreaching.”262 
5. States Rights 
 
One of the most dramatic areas of constitutional change has been in the area of “states 
rights”. The Court has brought new life to state sovereign immunity in a whole host of cases 
through a diverse set of mechanisms.263 The result, as with many of the cases above involving 
rights of action, qualified immunity, and arbitration, is that colorable claims are dismissed 
without regard for their merit.264 The result is that victims of illegal government conduct are 
denied access to justice.265 It also means that one important mechanism for holding government 
accountable to the people is eroded, and with it, respect for the rule of law. 
 
note 26, at 1142-3.  See e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (holding that the FAA preempts state law 
protecting access to courts in wage collection actions). 
261 Gateway, 105 F.3d 1147. 
262 Post, supra note 255, at 1235. 
263 Siegel summarizes the area: “the Court has reaffirmed and firmly constitutionalized the expansive and counter-
textual reading of the Eleventh Amendment …, held that Congress may not abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity under any of its Article I powers,  developed a fairly intrusive test to determine whether Congress has 
properly abrogated the states' immunity pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment powers, and applied that test with 
increasing rigor  and skepticism. At the same time, the Court has--without relying on the Eleventh Amendment or 
any other textual provision--held that the Constitution's structure requires that the states be accorded sovereign 
immunity from suits in their own courts (absent their consent) and from federal administrative proceedings that bear 
significant indicia of adjudication. In a variety of less well-known cases, the Court has also narrowed the well-
established doctrine whereby individuals may, notwithstanding sovereign immunity, seek injunctions against state 
officials in their official capacity, made it easier for state officials to obtain dismissal of lawsuits on sovereign 
immunity grounds at an early stage in the litigation process, and overruled precedent suggesting that a state does not 
posses full Eleventh Amendment immunity when it engages in routine commercial activity.  Siegel, supra note 26, 
at 1153-54, n 219-228. 
264 Siegel, supra note 26, at 1163. 
265 Id. 
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The justification for the revival of state immunity is a somewhat odd anthropomorphism 
of the state.266 The idea is that states are somehow endowed with sovereignty, the likes of which 
make them susceptible to moral harm or assaults to their dignity. The concept is a throwback to 
the days in which Kings and Queens ruled the land, when they were “the sovereign” wholly 
capable of suffering indignity at the hands of others. There is considerable debate as to whether 
or not dignity actually was the animating idea behind the 11th Amendment and sovereign 
immunity.267 The historical argument as to whether or not dignity was crucial to the 11th 
amendment and state sovereign immunity is somewhat wayward to our concerns. Like many 
issues in legal history, there are arguments and authority on both sides.  
As Seigel points out, however, even if dignity was the original rational for the 11th 
Amendment, it was a different notion of dignity than the one called forth by the Court today. The 
dignity referred to before consisted in the notion that sovereigns were equal and that it was 
inappropriate (or undignified) to subject one sovereign to the courts of another sovereign.268 This 
purportedly undermined the equality of sovereigns.269 However, the modern focus is on the 
indignity of being brought into court (even the state’s own court). While the former view 
sounded in notions about the equality of sovereigns, if Siegel is correct, the modern notion is not 
animated by equality, but by a sort of elitism which places the state sovereign above its citizens. 
 
266 Siegel notes that Justice Thomas has provided the fullest articulation of the dignity principle, "[t]he preeminent 
purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord the States the dignity that is consistent with their status as 
sovereign entities."  Id. (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n, FMC v. South Carolina State Ports Authortity, 535 U.S. 743 
(2002)).  Siegel, supra note 26, at 1157. 
267 Note that the dignity rational for sovereign immunity was only used sporadically. It came up in Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), and then in In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 503 (1887). It was only raised again in 
1959 where it was not relied upon. Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276, n.1 (1959). As the court 
pointed out in that case, “More than the dignity of a sovereign state was probably at issue, however. When the 
Eleventh Amendment was proposed many states were in financial difficulties and had defaulted on their debts The 
states could therefore use the new amendment not only in defense of theoretical sovereignty but also in a more 
practical way to forestall suits by individual creditors!”  Id. (citing MARIAN D. IRISH ET. AL., THE POLITICS OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 123 (1959)). 
268 This was the kind of dignity at play which was rejected by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia.  Siegel, 
supra note 26, at 1160. 
269 Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
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As Siegel notes, “As the Court sees it, compelling an unwilling state to defend a private lawsuit 
for damages threatens state dignity for much the same reason and in much the same way that 
subjecting a private party to such a suit diminishes the dignity and threatens the status of that 
private party”270 In other words, for Siegel, its part of a visceral reaction to having to defend 
oneself in court. 
However, modern states, be they national or federal, like corporations and associations, 
are artificial entities, and do not possess the moral qualities needed to have dignity. While the 
earlier conception of equal dignity of states vis-a vis other states resonates with democratic 
impulses (although it too raises concerns in our global interdependent world),271 the modern form 
of the idea, is decidedly undemocratic. Again, the idea is a throwback to pre-democratic times, 
when the sovereign made, imposed and was above the law. This is inconsistent with notions of 
equality before the law. The Court, in effect, is choosing to protect the “dignity” of the state over 
the rights of plaintiff citizens. It is undermining “the rule of law” and equality before the law, 
thereby elevating “rule by the sovereign” and undermining democratic accountability.272 
VI. CONCLUSION 
270 Siegel, supra note 26, at1162. 
271 See, e.g., DARREL MOELLENDORF, COSMOPOLITAN JUSTICE (2002) (critiquing John Rawls statist approach to 
global justice on Rawlsian grounds).  
272 Although beyond the scope of this paper, the present administration’s attack on the rule of law should be noted.  
The attack has taken many forms since the beginning of the “war on terror”, but a few recent examples include the 
president’s abuse of signing statements to selectively enforce the law as well as proposed amendments to the War 
Crimes Act to insulate government officials from suits based on war crimes committed against detainees. See, e.g. 
Press Release, American Bar Association, Blue-Ribbon Task Force Finds President Bush’s Signing Statements 
Undermine Separation of Powers (July 24, 2006) available at 
http://www.abanet.org/media/releases/news072406.html; and  Jeffrey Smith, Detainee Abuse Charges Feared: 
Shield Sought From '96 War Crimes Act, WASHINGTON POST, July 28, 2006, at A01, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/27/AR2006072701908_pf.html. 
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Given the political science findings from sections II-IV above, there is little hope that this 
work, or anyone else’s academic work, is going to revitalize our democracy.  This is not to say 
that critical work has no place or no chance of impact.  There is some hope that this piece, like 
the works of professors Abel, Baker, Feinman and Rustad, among others, will at least demystify 
what is at stake in modern tort reform.  Demystification is a necessary, although insufficient step 
towards transparency, accountability and a revitalized democracy.  Although many authors have 
all but said what was put so bluntly in the opening sentence to this article, the choice to be 
brutally frank about our democracy’s demise was intended to place the present course of tort 
“reform” in sharp relief against the unreflective idea that our ship of state and law has been 
sailing a steady democratic course for over two hundred years.  Although peculiar, this frankness 
was inspired in part by the authors of the American Law Institute Restatement (Third) of 
Products Liability. Although, their sincerity is dubious in a number of respects,273 their 
“restatement” of the law also placed the course of products liability in sharp relief against the 
path of the ALI Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A. Their, perhaps overzealous, 
crystallization of:  
• the death of strict liability in product design and failure to warn cases (§2);  
• the death of the consumer expectations test, and the requirement that the plaintiff prove 
the existence of reasonable alternative design (§2(b));  
• the nearly complete immunity given to prescription drugs (§ 6(c)); and  
 
273 The fact that they attempt to maintain that their restatement is not political, but merely a restatement of existing 
laws is as hard to accept as their assertion that the choice between the risk-utility approach to products liability and 
the consumer expectation approach is merely a pragmatic choice, a matter of getting it right, like figuring out the 
boiling point of water, rather than a choice deeply rooted in political as well as principled considerations of justice. 
See, James A. Henderson Jr. & Aron D. Twersky, What Europe, Japan and Other Countries Can Learn from the 
New American Restatement of Products Liability, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 14. (1999). 
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• the pass given to “unavoidably unsafe” products such as drugs, cigarettes and alcohol,274 
made it very clear just how far off course the law of products liability was going from the path of 
the Second Restatement, and what was being lost from the perspective of consumer protection 
and corporate responsibility. Whether one thinks the Third Restatement was merely a cold but 
brutally accurate obituary or a politically motivated attempt to put a bounty on the head of strict 
liability, 275 it brought the issue out in stark relief.  As Ellen Wertheimer notes, “The Third 
Restatement… made it impossible for courts to ignore what they had done, and many did not like 
what they saw.”276 
What they saw, once the dust settled, was that the risks and losses did not go away. In 
fact, those risks and loses fell on innocent consumers who are not only at a disadvantage from 
the perspective of making products safer, but who also are not equally equipped to insure for, 
 
274 Earlier outlines of the present work included a section depicting the rise of consumer protection and strict liability 
in democratically accountable Europe and the fall of strict liability and consumer protection in “manufacturer’s 
accountable America.”  Luke Nottage in his comparative study of products liability in Japan the U.S.  E.U., and 
Australia, depicts EU law as making steady pro-consumer progress from the 1960s to the present, Australia making 
rather steady progress from the 60s until about 2000, Japan making very little pro-consumer progress until 1994, 
when it adopted its Product Liability Law which was modeled on the E.U. directive, and the United States, whose 
pro-consumer product liability law peaked in the early 80s and started a rather steep decline until the present.  Luke 
Nottage, Comparing Product Safety and Liability Law in Japan: From Minamata to Mad cows – and Mitsubishi in 
PRODUCT LIABILITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 336 (Duncan Fairgrieve ed., 2005).  See also Geraint G. 
Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective Than the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 985, 994 (1998); Josephine Liu, Two Roads Diverged in a Yellow Wood: The 
European Community Stays on the Path to Strict Liabilit,y 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.1940 (2004).  Cf. Matias Reisman, 
Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 
51 AM. J. COMP. L.751, 801 (2003) (somewhat more cautious about the E.U. being more protective of consumers); 
and cf. Jane Stapleton, Products Liability in the United Kingdom: The Myths of Reform, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 45, 53-61 
(1999) (arguing that the E.U. also uses a negligence standard in design and failure to warn cases). 
275 See, FEINMAN, supra, note 8 at 40.  The idea that §2(b) represents a wish list for manufacturers has been 
repeatedly cited since it was first stated by Frank Vadall in 1997.  See, e.g., id.; Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: 
Unknowable Dangers, the Third Restatement, and the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV.
889, 927 note 116 (2005); Aaron Arnold, Note, Rethinking Design Defect Law: Should Arizona Adopt the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 45 ARIZ. L.REV. 173, 174 (Spring 2003); Douglas A. Kysar, The 
Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1727 n.116 (2003) (quoting Green v. Smith & Nephew 
AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 751 n.16 (Wis. 2001) (quoting Frank J. Vandall,, Constructing a Roof Before the 
Foundation is Prepared: The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 261 (1997)). 
276 Wertheimer, supra at 274.  Although she does note that some courts did follow the Third Restatement even 
though it conflicted with earlier precedent. Id.
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absorb or spread the losses they suffer.277 Although the campaign to see the corporate producer 
as the symbol of American freedom -- like a mustang, tethered to a shrub in the desert of social-
welfare tort law, being fed upon by greedy parasitic lawyers and consumers-- persists,278 the 
reality is that, when horses run wild, people get trampled. Under the Third Restatement, those 
who trample (who profit from putting products into the stream of commerce, who are best placed 
to test and make products safe or warn of their hazards, and are best placed to insure against, 
absorb and spread the risks and losses) now have a much better chance at avoiding responsibility 
and liability for those losses. This not only raises the risk of being trodden (by undermining the 
deterrent effect of products liability law) but it also raises the risk that once trodden upon, the 
consumer must bear the loss.           
Although she is perhaps overly optimistic, Wertheimer’s argument, that “the courts are 
now in the process of reaffirming their commitment to retaining--or reinstating--the doctrine [of 
strict liability]” because they did not like what they saw, provides some hope that if people see 
clearly what is at stake in the current wave of tort reform, they may actually react progressively, 
putting torts back to work for democratic progress.    
 
277 As Reisman notes, “In the United States, accident victims are not nearly protected comprehensively. In 1997, 16 
% of all Americans and 37 % of the low-income population had no health coverage at all, and the number kept 
rising. Only 66 % of the adult workforce have disability benefits, and these benefits are usually less than ample. All 
States have enacted workers compensation schemes but the compensation they pay is fairly low and often 
insufficient to make ends meet. Overall, social and workers insurance cover only about three-fifths of the economic 
consequences of accidents, forcing victims to bear the remaining 40 % themselves.”  Reisman, supra note 59, at 
828. 
278 See, e.g. Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom, Responsibility, and Risk: Fundamental Principles Supporting Tort 
Reform, 36 IND. L. REV. 645, 645 (“The free enterprise system is the engine that drives America’s healthy economy, 
the benefits of which necessarily include inherent risks. Unfortunately, many facets of America’s civil justice system 
operate to shift all of those risks to the entrepreneurs who produce the consumer goods and services that make 
people’s lives easier or more pleasant….The tort system has undergone a transformation from one designed solely to 
redress wrongs to one focusing more and more on criminal-style retribution and redistribution of wealth .”) 
Although it is doubtful that this statement was ever true, it may have come closer to the truth some 30 years ago, but 
not today.  
